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Introduction 
The published works that I am putting forward for this PhD are as follows:  
 
 Andrew Whitehead, A Mission in Kashmir, New Delhi: Viking Penguin, 2007, xii + 
244pp, ISBN-13: 978-0-67008-127-1, ISBN-10: 0-67008-127-2 
 Andrew Whitehead, ‘The People’s Militia: Communists and Kashmiri nationalism in 
the 1940s’, Twentieth Century Communism: a journal of international history, 2, 2010, 
pp.141-68 
 Andrew Whitehead, ‘Kashmir’s Conflicting Identities’ [review essay], History 
Workshop Journal, 58, 2004, pp.335-40 
 
This critical overview will explain how these works came to be written and the 
methodology of the underlying research. It will establish that these writings are 
rigorous and objective and that they constitute a significant contribution to original 
knowledge about an issue of substance, the early stages of a dispute which has 
continued to bedevil India and Pakistan since independence in 1947. The overview 
will discuss the purpose and value of oral history in Partition and related studies. It 
will describe the historiographical context of the published work and their critical 
reception, establishing that the research has been recognised as innovative and 
important by scholars of repute. The overview also considers subsequent scholarship 
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about the origins of the Kashmir crisis and more general informed discussion about 
Kashmir’s recent history.  
  This overview concludes, as required, with a bibliography of my writing (and a list of 
my radio documentaries) about Partition in 1947, which created out of the British Raj 
the independent nations of India and Pakistan, and about the Kashmir conflict which 
arose from Partition and the end of British ‘paramountcy’ over India’s princely states.   
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1. Context of the research 
My writing about Kashmir in the late 1940s is a retelling of a deeply contested 
historical narrative. I use oral history and first hand testimony to explore the lived 
experience of a period of political turbulence and military conflict which saw the 
eruption of a continuing crisis about who rules the Kashmir valley. The published 
works which you are being asked to consider seek to challenge narrowly geopolitical 
accounts of the origins of the Kashmir conflict, which often give little regard to how 
Kashmiris and others on the spot experienced, and viewed, the emerging rivalry 
between India and Pakistan for control of the princely state. It also interrogates the 
established nationalist narratives – Indian, Pakistani and indeed Kashmiri – of how 
the conflict began, disputing some of the elements of these rival versions of history. I 
seek to develop a more nuanced and complex account of how this intractable 
territorial and political dispute arose, and thus in part to suggest why it has been so 
difficult to resolve. 
  Kashmir has tended to stand apart from the rest of India in the historiography of 
independence and Partition in 1947, and the re-examining of the communal violence, 
sexual aggression and mass population movements which Partition occasioned. The 
new writing about Partition – which is built around first person accounts, often of 
those marginalised in conventional historical narratives – pays little regard to 
Kashmir.1  The Kashmir valley’s experience of Partition was distinct from that of 
                                                          
1
 For instance, Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of Silence: voices from the Partition of India, New Delhi: 
Viking Penguin, 1998 
8 
 
Punjab to the south, which witnessed the most acute violence and population 
movement in 1947. In Kashmir, the communal character of the crisis was less 
pronounced, it involved both conventional and irregular military forces rather than 
unorganised or loosely organised violence, and the conflict was pursued by states and 
those acting on their behalf. It is seen as exceptional. Part of my argument is that it is 
less exceptional than perceived by historians, both conventional and revisionist, and 
is better incorporated into accounts of Partition than standing on the margins or 
awkwardly outside.  
  There has been much innovative scholarship about Kashmir, but by and large this 
has avoided directly addressing the events of 1947. Certainly, recent scholarly writing 
has not sought to make use of oral history in narrating how the Kashmir conflict 
began. The most refreshing aspect of much of this scholarship is the absence of 
polemic or of a politicised undertow. Much of the earlier writing about Kashmir, 
including well researched accounts of its history, has been tarnished by partisan 
comment. Alastair Lamb, for example, has achieved eminence as a historian of 
Kashmir, but for him to write in extenuation of killings by Pakistani tribesmen, the 
event at the heart of my book A Mission in Kashmir, that ‘whatever happened in 
Baramula [sic] that day is as nothing when compared to what has happened to 
Kashmiri men, women and children at Indian hands since 1989’2 is to diminish his 
own authority. One of the most profound problems of writing about Kashmir, where 
                                                          
2
 Alastair Lamb, Incomplete Partition: the genesis of the Kashmir dispute, 1947-1948, Hertingfordbury: 
Roxford, 1997, p.187 
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suspicions are so deep rooted and loyalties so deeply entrenched, is in gaining the 
attention and confidence of those from different political, religious and national 
traditions, and seeking to establish a narrative which supercedes these often 
competing identities.   
  In my own work, I have tried to avoid any partiality – a task which is difficult when 
writing about Kashmir, where even descriptive terms of political geography (Indian-
held Kashmir, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Azad Kashmir) are taken as betraying an 
allegiance. The sensitivity stems above all, of course, because of the continuing 
violence and political instability in Indian-administered Kashmir, where an armed 
insurgency erupted (some would say was rekindled) in 1989 prompting a massive, 
and continuing, deployment of Indian security forces. The published works submitted 
are not about the recent insurgency, but these items would not have been written 
but for the renewed and profound violence, nor would they have received the same 
attention. All writing about contemporary Kashmir is inevitably seen through the 
prism of the long-lasting political and security crisis there, and in my case, it was that 
crisis which first took me to Srinagar. I should explain how I came to know Kashmir, 
and how I came to be in a position to write with a claim to academic rigour. As my 
career has been, for a PhD candidate, rather unconventional I will explain at some 
length how I became involved in gathering oral testimony, and my growing interest in 
Kashmir. 
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2. Personal history 
I studied history as an undergraduate at Oxford University, and was awarded first 
class honours. While I took a paper in ‘Imperialism and Nationalism’, my main interest 
was in British history, particularly of the nineteenth century. I was influenced by the 
‘history from below’ approach, read E.P. Thompson, and subscribed to the then 
recently established History Workshop Journal.  As a postgraduate, I studied at the 
Centre for the Study of Social History at the University of Warwick, which had been 
founded by E.P. Thompson. I developed a modest acquaintance with Raphael Samuel 
and some others in the History Workshop circle, in part because I invited them to 
come and speak at the Radical History Group which I helped to set up at Warwick. I 
was awarded an M.A. in Social History, the research component of which concerned 
tramping artisans,3 and then began work on a doctoral thesis at Warwick with the 
title ‘Popular Politics and Society in late-Victorian Clerkenwell’. The subject was 
suggested to me by Jay Winter and I was supervised by Michael Shepherd and later 
by Royden Harrison. This was a study of political activity and occupational and social 
structure in an area of inner London which was, at various times, seen as a heartland 
of artisan radicalism and of a strand of socialism which attracted support in part from 
the semi-skilled and unskilled. My SSRC funding only allowed two years full-time 
research towards my doctorate and while I have continued both to research and 
                                                          
3 ‘The decline of tramping in two trade unions (the Amalgamated Union of Cabinet Makers and the 
Typographical Association) 1840-1914’, M.A. dissertation, University of Warwick, 1978. This research 
also led to the publication of J.W. Rounsfell, On the Road: journeys of a tramping printer, Horsham: 
Caliban, 1982, a first-hand account of the life of a tramping artisan originally published in the journal of 
the Typographical Association, which I edited as well as providing an introduction and postscript.    
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write about London radicalism, to my regret, I never completed this PhD. I have 
however written articles for peer reviewed and other journals and entries for 
reference series based on this work, and copies of the five chapters of the thesis 
which were tolerably close to completion have been deposited in local reference 
libraries.4 
  My career has been as a news journalist with the BBC, and principally with the BBC 
World Service where I am currently the editor of news and current affairs 
programmes. Early in my career, I made a number of radio programmes for which I 
gathered oral testimony, and this became a hallmark of my broadcast work. Several 
of these documentaries were about aspects of British popular politics, and my audio 
archive of interviews with British political activists – sixty-five interviews in all, some 
conducted on behalf of the BBC and others out of personal interest – has been 
deposited with the British Library Sound Archive.5  
                                                          
4 ‘Notes on Sources: Labour history and dissolved company records’, Bulletin of the Society for the Study 
of Labour History, 44, 1982, pp.45-6; ‘Quorum Pars Fui: the autobiography of H.H. Champion’ 
[documentary essay], Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History, 47, 1983, pp.17-35; ‘”Against 
the Tyranny of Kings and Princes”: radicalism in Workers in the Dawn’, Gissing Newsletter, 22/4, 1986, 
pp.13-28; ‘Dan Chatterton and his “Atheistic Communistic Scorcher”’, History Workshop Journal, 25, 
1988, pp.85-99; ‘Notes on the Labour Press: the New World and the O’Brienite colony in Kansas’, Bulletin 
of the Society for the Study of Labour History, 53/3, 1988, pp.40-3; ‘Red London: radicals and socialists in 
late-Victorian Clerkenwell’, Socialist History, 18, 2000, pp.1-31; ‘Clerkenwell Tales’ [review essay], 
History Workshop Journal, 68, 2009, pp.247-50; ‘Clerkenwell as hell – Gissing’s “nether world”’, Gissing 
Journal, 46/4, 2010, pp.27-34; ‘George Gissing, The Nether World’  in Andrew Whitehead and Jerry 
White (eds), London Fictions, Nottingham: Five Leaves, 2013; entries in the multi-volume Dictionary of 
Labour Biography on H.H. Champion, Daniel Chatterton, Martin Boon and (co-authored with Gary Entz) 
Joseph Radford. Chapters towards my uncompleted thesis have been deposited with the Islington Local 
History Library and the Marx Memorial Library, both of which are located in Clerkenwell. 
5
 British Library Sound Archive, C1377. A full list of the material deposited is given on my personal 
website - http://www.andrewwhitehead.net/oral-history-list.html. Audio of several of the BBC radio 
programmes for which the interviews were conducted is also on my website - 
http://www.andrewwhitehead.net/documentaries-and-features.html (sites accessed 1 January 2013). 
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  In 1992, the year after the fall of Soviet Communism, I made my most ambitious 
radio documentaries to date, a series of five programmes entitled ‘What’s Left of 
Communism?’ The opening programme was a quick march through the history of 
international communism, including material from interviews with onetime British 
communists, among them E.P. Thompson and Denis Healey, and voices from around 
the world. Subsequent programmes examined the resilience of the communist 
movement in Cuba, Italy, South Africa and India. This last programme occasioned my 
first visit to India, and won a prestigious international award.6 
  The following year, my career took a new path when I became a BBC news 
correspondent based in Delhi reporting for radio and television. Within weeks, I made 
my first reporting trip to Kashmir, where the separatist insurgency and Indian 
response to it had led to exceptional levels of violence and civil unrest. It was a 
running story throughout my time in India as a correspondent, and I made a dozen or 
more visits to Srinagar and other parts of Jammu and Kashmir, got to know key 
figures in the dispute (including Indian government ministers and separatist leaders) 
and through Kashmiri journalists in particular, gained some sense of Kashmiri opinion. 
I later was able to visit Pakistan Kashmir. Kashmir was the most difficult story on the 
foreign correspondent’s South Asia beat – above all, because almost every detail of 
every story was contested, in a manner I haven’t otherwise encountered except in Sri 
Lanka during its civil war. 
                                                          
6
 The audio of this series is available at http://www.andrewwhitehead.net/whats-left-of-
communism.html (accessed 1 January 2013). The programme about Indian Communism won the Asia-
Pacific Broadcasting Union Prize in 1993. 
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  At the end of my tour in Delhi, I was commissioned by the BBC to make a five part 
radio documentary series on the fiftieth anniversary of the independence of India and 
Pakistan. This was intended to be about the lived experience of Partition, not the 
diplomacy and politics of that process. Although it occasioned one of the most 
profound population movements of the century and huge loss of life, at that time the 
history of Partition had been told almost exclusively as a political rather than social 
story. The personal accounts of living through violence or being a refugee had been 
reflected in fiction and in cinema but not in historical narrative. There had been until 
the mid-1990s very little organised oral history about Partition, and to add urgency to 
the need to retrieve and give shape to these memories, those who had lived through 
Partition as adults were of advanced years. For this award- winning series ‘India: a 
people partitioned’, I travelled across India, Pakistan and Bangladesh recording 
memories of 1947 – not the high politics of that year (though a few of those I talked 
to had a role in that process), but the upheaval, the trauma and the migration.7 The 
interviews conducted for this series formed the basis of an oral history collection now 
held by the archive of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the 
University of London.8 This has been supplemented by subsequent interviews about 
                                                          
7
 The audio of these radio documentaries is available at http://www.andrewwhitehead.net/india-a-
people-partitioned.html (accessed 2 January 2013). ‘India: a people partitioned’ won a bronze award at 
the 1998 New York Festival. 
8
 SOAS archive, OA3. The deposit was made in three stages, the first two of which are described in this 
website entry: 
http://squirrel.soas.ac.uk/dserve/dserve.exe?dsqIni=Dserve.ini&dsqApp=Archive&dsqDb=Catalog&dsqC
md=show.tcl&dsqSearch=%28RefNo==%27OA3%20%20%27%29 . A full list of the items, and some of the 
audio, is posted on my personal website: http://www.andrewwhitehead.net/partition-voices.html (sites 
accessed 2 January 2013).  Manisha Sobhrajani has also conducted interviews in Kashmir, at my initiative, 
particularly with veterans of the women’s self-defence corps set up in 1947. 
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Partition and related events. The deposit now consists in total of 205 interviews and 
recordings of which fifty-eight relate to events in Kashmir in 1947. This archive has 
been used particularly by Yasmin Khan for her book The Great Partition which draws 
on twenty or so of these interviews, none relating to Kashmir.9 
  Several of these interviews were with writers who captured the Partition experience 
in their novels and short stories, often based on their personal experience. I was 
particularly arrested by interviews with Amrita Pritam, Krishna Baldev Vaid, Bapsi 
Sidhwa and Bhisham Sahni, and also spoke to Khushwant Singh, Shaukat Osman, 
Qurratulain Hyder and relatives of Saadat Hasan Manto. My occasional writing about 
Partition literature has been cited in more rigorously researched studies of the field.10 
  It was while gathering material for this radio series that I first visited the Kashmiri 
town of Baramulla and – as I relate in the first chapter of A Mission in Kashmir – 
chanced across St Joseph’s mission hospital and met Italian-born Sister Emilia. Her 
vivid memories of surviving the attack by the tribal lashkar (the term for an armed 
raiding party) fifty years earlier initially struck me as a compelling human story. As I 
came across others with memories of that incident, I also came to appreciate just 
how crucial an event that was in the first chapter of the Kashmir conflict. The 
ransacking and killings at the mission hospital occurred within hours of the maharaja 
of Kashmir’s accession to India and the beginning of an airlift to the valley of Indian 
                                                          
9
 Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: the making of India and Pakistan, New Haven and London: Yale UP, 
2007 
10
 Notably in Jill Didur, Unsettling Partition: Literature, Gender, Memory, University of Toronto Press, 
2006. 
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troops, the first episode in a military presence that continues to this day. The 
accounts I heard gave a powerful human dimension to a moment of profound 
geopolitical crisis.  
  Serendipity also gave me access to the modest cache of records held by the Mill Hill 
Missionaries in Kashmir, and a hugely more valuable treasure trove in their London 
archives. This included a remarkable discovery – a hand-written account of a hundred 
pages reciting the details of the attack on the Baramulla mission set down by a priest 
who was witness to the event. This manuscript account had quite possibly never been 
read by anyone but its author until I came across it. Both journalists and historians 
relish untouched source material, and you can’t get much better than this. I had a 
personal mission now, to retrieve memories from all sides of the attack on Baramulla, 
and use these to offer an informed and impartial account of the initial eruption of the 
Kashmir conflict and to explain why India ended 1947 in control of the Kashmir valley. 
This material formed the basis of a documentary I made for BBC Radio 4 in 2003.11  
  In the autumn of 2003, with my research well advanced, I had the good fortune to 
spend what amounted to a sabbatical semester as a BBC-nominated Knight-Wallace 
Journalism Fellow at the University of Michigan. By then, I had also been invited to 
become one of the editors of History Workshop Journal, a peer reviewed academic 
journal published twice yearly by Oxford University Press. This was not a result of my 
work on Kashmir, but it was a boost to my confidence as a practitioner of history and 
                                                          
11
 ‘An Incident in Kashmir’ was broadcast on BBC Radio 4 in August 2003. The audio is available on my 
personal website - http://www.andrewwhitehead.net/documentaries-and-features.html (accessed 2 
January 2013). 
16 
 
strengthened my resolve to write a book about the attack on Baramulla and what it 
revealed about the wider invasion of Kashmir in late 1947. The Ann Arbor campus, as 
well as having a talented array of scholars of South Asia, offered a library with 
excellent holdings, where I was able to immerse myself in another range of testimony 
about Kashmir in 1947 - the contemporary reporting of journalists on the spot.  
  A Mission in Kashmir was published late in 2007, and its critical reception will be 
discussed later in this essay. I was invited back to the University of Michigan to give 
the Hovey lecture in 2008. I have also given papers based on my research at 
international conferences at the University of Southampton and at SOAS, as well as 
giving more informal talks in Delhi and at several other venues.  
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3. Research method and argument 
The emphasis of my research has been on the use of personal stories to illustrate, 
supplement and challenge the established accounts of the origins of the Kashmir 
conflict, and to provide a sense of how the turmoil of 1947 was experienced by those 
in Kashmir who lived through it. There is a powerful feeling in Kashmir that Kashmiris 
have been marginalised – in the governance of their state, in the crucial moments of 
decision about Kashmir’s future, and in the historical narrative. Part of my purpose 
was to collect and collate individual accounts of events in Kashmir in late 1947, and to 
place the lived experience of this crucial time in Kashmir’s history at the centre of the 
narrative. 
  My initial goal in gathering oral testimony was to retrieve accounts of the event at 
the heart of my study, the attack on the mission hospital at Baramulla. Over time, I 
succeeded in securing interviews with a range of people who were in or close to the 
mission during the attack and its immediate aftermath – conversations conducted (on 
a few occasions by others on my behalf) on four continents. I also tracked down 
several others with direct memories of the attack who declined to be interviewed – 
two of whom were willing, however, to set down in writing their personal recollection 
of the event as long as they were not named. In my initial visit to Baramulla, I also 
talked to two elderly townspeople who had lived through the tribal army’s entry to 
the town and provided a vivid account of that visitation. As my research developed, it 
18 
 
broadened out beyond testimony directly relating to Baramulla into an enquiry into 
the conflict in the Kashmir valley in 1947, and the popular response to it.  
  Conducting oral history in a conflict zone presents profound problems. The simple 
issue of safety is one of them. I have visited the town of Baramulla several times, 
usually accompanied by the BBC reporter based in Srinagar, but the security situation 
has never been sufficiently calm to allow me to stroll through the centre of the town. 
While my initial meeting with Sister Emilia was a matter of chance, most of the other 
interviews I have conducted in Baramulla have been arranged by local journalists on 
my behalf. There is a deeper problem – in a region as battered by violence as the 
Kashmir valley, where at least 1% of the adult population has died in the past quarter-
century of insurgency and instability, there is an understandable reluctance to share 
memories which might entail risk, or which might conflict with the current political or 
community interests shared by the interviewee. There is also a carapace that needs 
to be broken through when dealing with memories which have been hallowed by 
frequent repetition, to get beyond a much stated personal narrative and retrieve 
memories which have not been hardened by constant rendition. 
  My general approach to the retrieval of oral testimonies has been: 
 to seek the widest possible range of testimonies, from civilians, missionaries, public 
figures and combatants on both sides; 
 where possible when talking to local residents in particular, to be introduced and 
accompanied by a local intermediary; 
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 to focus on direct memories of events and incidents witnessed and experienced 
rather than a more general, indirectly remembered, account; 
 to start without preconceived notions, and be willing to ‘go with the flow’ of an 
interview, so often interviewing at some length; 
 to probe and interrogate memories of particularly noteworthy events, asking for 
details and personal aspect and involvement to get beyond the initial recitation. 
I was helped by considerable experience in conducting interviews with the elderly 
about memories from many decades earlier. The job of a radio correspondent is in 
large measure that of a professional interviewer, and winning the confidence of an 
interviewee, putting them at ease, is a required skill in oral history as in radio 
journalism. Another key skill of a news reporter – seeking to validate recollections 
and memories, searching for corroboration, checking shared memory against other 
source material – is also essential to the practise of oral history. While shared 
memory of events many years earlier is often unreliable, other more conventional 
historical source material – official records, memoirs, reports and inquiries – are also 
often partisan and incomplete, and oral history offers the very considerable 
advantage of being able to challenge and interrogate the memories offered. 
  In the course of my research, I also have made use of other forms of first-hand 
testimony. Father Shanks’s manuscript account of the attack on the Baramulla 
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mission, held in the archive of the Mill Hill missionaries12, is the most revealing such 
source. There are other briefer accounts, particularly in British archives as diplomats 
sought to understand the circumstances of the killing of British nationals at Baramulla, 
arrange the evacuation of the sizeable British community in Srinagar and gain 
purchase on the rapidly developing military and political situation in the Kashmir 
valley.  Some archive holdings of correspondence have also been of value, particularly 
the letters of the American news correspondent, Margaret Parton. That leads me to 
mention the other primary source on which I relied – contemporary news reports. 
Sidney Smith of the Daily Express was held hostage at the Baramulla hospital 
alongside the survivors of the lashkar’s initial attack. Two other foreign 
correspondents, Margaret Parton and her husband-to-be Eric Britter, were also – by 
chance – in Kashmir as the invasion force approached. A battalion of Indian and 
foreign news reporters made their way to Kashmir as soon as they could find space – 
officially or otherwise – on the Indian military airlift. Some of their reports were 
included in the Indian government’s White Paper on Jammu & Kashmir, published in 
1948, but this was inevitably a partisan selection. Otherwise there has previously 
been no systematic attempt to make use of this rich source material which, when 
even the basic chronology of the conflict is in dispute, is at the least an unfortunate 
oversight. 
 
                                                          
12
 The order’s archives are now at Freshfield on Merseyside. With the permission of the archivist, I have 
posted a full transcript of Father Shanks’s manuscript on my personal website - 
http://www.andrewwhitehead.net/father-shankss-kashmir-diary.html (accessed 4 January 2013). 
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4. Original contribution to knowledge 
The biggest achievement of A Mission in Kashmir, I would suggest, has been to 
reclaim space for lived experience and personal testimony in a history which is often 
told in impersonal terms, as a battle between two newly independent states for 
territory. It has demonstrated that even with such a bitter and enduring conflict, and 
testimony gathered half-a-century or more after the event, oral history can redefine a 
historical narrative and reshape the contours of historical discourse. In support of 
these assertions, I want to spend a moment arguing about the value of oral history in 
the particular circumstances of telling the story of how the Kashmir conflict arose. 
  Oral history, in the telling phrase of one of its leading practitioners in South Asia, has 
to be more than ‘a seasoning to enliven documentary evidence’.13 Such seasoning has 
a value in itself. Historians tell stories, just as journalists do, and to tell them well they 
need to get as near to the events they relate as they can, and to retrieve the 
anecdote and personal detail which makes a moment or an event memorable. 
Hearing from those who witnessed the killings at the Baramulla mission, who were 
bereaved by those events and whose lives were thrown out of kilter, is to sense the 
shock and confusion they lived through. Those memories have, even when not shared, 
been rehearsed and burnished over the decades. They are not entirely reliable, 
though when there has been an opportunity to corroborate even incidental details, 
most direct memory bears tolerably accurate witness - and those who share 
                                                          
13
 The phrase is that of Shahid Amin, ‘They Also Followed Gandhi’, in Saurabh Dube (ed), Postcolonial 
Passages: contemporary history-writing on India, New Delhi: Oxford UP, 2004, pp.132-58.  
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recollections are speaking their own truth, which helps to tease out the different 
perspectives to and narratives of an event. Yet the purpose of oral history is not to 
illustrate and add piquancy to an already established narrative, but to interrogate and 
challenge - and on some occasions to repudiate - that narrative. The personal 
testimony I have gathered about the attack on the Baramulla mission, the 
organisation and indiscipline of the invading lashkar, the response to the invasion 
among Kashmiris, and the steps taken in Srinagar to save the city from ransack have 
been the determinants of my narrative – supported by other source material – rather 
than ancillary to the fact. 
  There is another peril in oral history, and in narratives which focus on personal 
experience. The use of testimony and memory, it has been argued in the context of 
Partition studies, ‘only become[s] meaningful if they retain some measure of 
understanding of the broader developments that have framed the Partition and post-
Partition processes’.14 My own work has not been a rejection of conventional political 
history, the story of nations and wars, but a re-examination of a profoundly 
important political moment which gives voice to those who lived through that 
moment. The emphasis on personal testimony has not been at the expense of more 
traditional sources. The official archives have been scoured, contemporary 
newspapers trawled, military and political memoirs imbibed, secondary accounts – 
the partisan as well as the scholarly – sought and read.  The result is a synthesis, but 
                                                          
14
 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009, p.5. 
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the element which is most innovative, within the context of Kashmiri studies, is the 
embracing of oral history.  
    
So, what has this use of first hand testimony, supported by secondary sources, 
added precisely to knowledge about the start of the Kashmir crisis? I would suggest 
that my work has - 
 established the course of events at the Baramulla mission, including who the 
attackers were, how they conducted themselves, and the level of casualties inflicted, 
so for the first time setting down an authoritative account of the most notorious 
single episode in the opening stages of the Kashmir conflict; 
 demonstrated the significant initial local support for the Pakistani tribal force, and the 
manner in which looting and attacks on civilians squandered that support; 
 put forward evidence of assistance from some elements of the new Pakistani state 
for the invasion, and detailed for the first time the remedial actions taken by 
Pakistan’s leadership to address indiscipline in the lashkar; 
 offered fresh evidence that the delay in the lashkar’s advance as a result of 
indiscipline may have been crucial in frustrating their ambition to take control of 
Srinagar; 
 established the extent of the popular mobilisation in the Kashmiri capital against 
princely rule and the manner in which this was transformed into a popular force to 
protect the city from the tribal army; 
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 discussed the evidence of abduction and sexual violence in the Kashmir valley in 1947, 
with the arresting, if tentative, suggestion that a number of non-Muslim Kashmiri 
women were abducted locally and may well have lived out their lives close to their 
area of upbringing but with a new name and religion. 
  While A Mission in Kashmir did not set out to add to the substantial corpus of 
writing about the details of Kashmir’s accession to India, it presents the most forceful 
and best evidenced argument to date that the maharaja signed the accession 
document a few hours after (not a few hours before, as Indian official accounts insist) 
the start of India’s military airlift to Kashmir which eventually succeeded in repulsing 
the invasion force.15  
  All this amounts to an important addition to an understanding of the modern history 
of Kashmir and of South Asia, based on rigorous research and on the use of original 
source material, much of it never before used as a basis for scholarship. 
  A Mission in Kashmir is limited in its scope, as its title suggests. It is not an attempt 
to redefine Kashmir’s place in the wider narrative of Partition. Yet it is worth pausing 
for a moment to consider whether Kashmiri exceptionalism – the supposition that 
Kashmir moved to a different rhythm to the rest of South Asia – is justified. Talbot 
and Singh have put forward five defining elements of what they describe as the 
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‘communal’ violence of Partition which mark a break with earlier, ‘traditional’ forms 
of violence. These are: 
 a desire to ethnically cleanse minority populations; 
 violence within the end of empire political context of the contest for power and 
territory; 
 violence that was more intense and sadistic than anything that had preceded it;  
 violence that invaded the private sphere; 
 with evidence of a high degree of preparation and organisation by para-military 
groups.16 
All these defining features were evident in the Kashmir valley in the closing weeks of 
1947. The invasion of Kashmir in October 1947 led eventually to war between India 
and Pakistan, and the Kashmir issue has a particular standing as a causus belli, but the 
events on the ground in the aftermath of Partition fit (not perfectly, but tolerably well) 
the pattern evident more widely across the sub-continent. More than that, the 
mobilising of the lashkar that entered Kashmir, and the nature of its actions there, 
were shaped by Partition – not simply by the desire to forestall Kashmir’s accession to 
India, but by religious or communal grievance about a Hindu prince ruling a largely 
Muslim populace, and a desire for vengeance against the Sikh communities in 
Muzaffarabad and Baramulla in response to anti-Muslim pogroms in Punjab. The 
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nature of the violence in the Kashmir valley in October and November 1947 cannot 
be understood other than as part of the upheaval of Partition.   
  My work on Kashmir has also used documentary evidence and personal testimony to 
look at the way in which myths have been developed and enshrined in support of a 
particular narrative – so touching on the increasing academic focus on testimony as 
texts which enlighten an understanding of how events are remembered and re-
remembered to serve a personal, community or political purpose. A conflict which 
has produced so many martyrs, and where the level of contestation has been so 
intense, is fruitful ground for studying layers of memory, the meaning attached to 
shared recollection and the making and remaking of myths. Alessandro Portelli, a 
leading practitioner of how memory and myth become entwined, has studied 
accounts of valour among the Italian Resistance to Nazi occupation which have close 
analogies to the stories developed in Baramulla just a few years later. His argument 
that ‘public memory manipulates the events into contrasting morality tales about 
guilt, responsibility and innocence, and into political apologues on the meaning and 
morality of Resistance’ could apply with equal force to Kashmir’s martyrs of 1947.17 
The work of Shahid Amin on the memories of the violence in Chauri Chaura in 1922, 
and the manner in which oral accounts even almost seventy years later can retrieve a 
subaltern viewpoint of the nationalist movement inspired (but not entirely shaped) 
by Gandhi, is another powerful reference point for the use of distant memories of an 
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exceptional and traumatic moment.18 My research treads, albeit less expertly, on 
similar ground in looking at the propagation of stories and myths (by which I mean 
not that they are invented, but their most familiar telling has been moulded for a 
particular purpose) of valour.  
  The violence in Baramulla in 1947 produced two ‘martyrs’ in particular whose 
memory has been kept alive, and shaped, to support a particular goal or interest. 
Take the various accounts of the death at the hands of the invading force of Spanish-
born Mother Teresalina and of her dying words. Father Shanks, who was present at 
her death at the mission hospital, recorded that she ‘slowly sank into 
unconsciousness’ and made no mention of any last words. Within a few years, her 
dying words were widely cited within the Roman Catholic church as ‘I offer myself as 
a victim for the conversion of Kashmir’. More recently, in a climate where seeking 
converts in Muslim areas is seen as hazardous, these words have been revised, rather 
crudely in some clerical publications, to suggest her concern was ‘the people’ rather 
than the conversion of Kashmir. This is a story which has at its root a personal tragedy 
and perhaps an element of heroism, which has been retold with the goal of valorising 
the church’s missionary activity in Kashmir.  
  The myth of Maqbool Sherwani, a member of the pro-India National Conference 
militia who was killed (crucified would be the word used by some) by the Pakistani 
invaders, is an even more powerfully cultivated and contested narrative. His story has 
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been told and retold by the likes of Gandhi, Margaret Bourke-White and Mulk Raj 
Anand, who have depicted him as a martyr to a tolerant and secular (and so, Indian) 
vision of Kashmir’s future. That myth has been so energetically propagated over the 
years – made use of in Indian official statements and, for example, in the naming of 
buildings – that many Kashmiris have developed a countervailing viewpoint, that 
Sherwani was a traitorous agent of Indian aggression. 19   
 
  After the publication of A Mission in Kashmir, I continued to pursue research into 
the origins of the Kashmir dispute, which has led to a further publication – an article 
in a peer reviewed journal20 – again drawing on the testimony I gathered from those 
who lived through the violence in Kashmir in late 1947. It is the first rigorous 
discussion of communist influence within the mainstream Kashmiri nationalist 
movement in the 1940s. The influence of a small number of communists within 
Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference has often been asserted, usually by political 
critics of Abdullah, but never before examined in any depth. The radical ‘Naya 
Kashmir’ manifesto adopted by the National Conference in 1944, a quite exceptional 
document endorsing land redistribution, constitutional reform and gender equality, 
was drafted by communists. In the turbulent weeks of October and November 1947, 
with the maharaja absent and an invading force approaching, communists led in 
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mobilising a popular militia to enhance security in the capital, and to assist Indian 
troops in repulsing the raiders from Pakistan.  
  The article also discusses the remarkable initiative of the raising of a women’s self-
defence force in Srinagar, which drilled and was trained in the use of rifles, in 
response to the peril in which the city was placed. In the highly politicised climate of 
present day Kashmir, the forming of an armed volunteer force in support of Indian 
rule has been blotted out of the popular memory.  Retrieving the role of communists 
within Kashmiri nationalism, and particularly in this volunteer force, again challenges 
the over-simple narrative propagated by those with a claim to Kashmir.21  
 
Also submitted for consideration is a review essay in a peer reviewed journal22 
discussing four titles about Kashmir’s modern history. This is put forward to 
demonstrate my sustained scholarly interest in Kashmir. The review identified an 
increased scholarly focus, and rigour of research and argument, on Kashmir during 
and after Dogra princely rule. The article asserts: 
There’s an enormous literature about Kashmir, much of it deeply partisan, 
densely written and ill researched. The corpus of informed and tolerably 
unbiased historical writing about Kashmir is slender. That makes the volumes 
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reviewed here all the more welcome. Together, they appear to augur a new, and 
enormously more promising, chapter in Kashmir studies. Almost a coming of age. 
That assessment remains valid and the review essay has been cited by other scholars 
of modern Kashmir23 and widely consulted24.  
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5. Critical reception 
A Mission in Kashmir was fortunate in attracting attention in the news media, 
including reviews by leading scholars and journalists, and in prompting considered 
discussion in scholarly journals. The book was generally recognised as well researched 
and innovative in its approach, clearly argued and expressed, and a considerable 
addition to the literature on Kashmir’s (and so the region’s) modern history. Some of 
these reviews challenge aspects of the argument and suggest shortcomings – but 
there has been, as far as I am aware, no hostile review of the book. 
  The most substantial academic consideration of A Mission in Kashmir is by 
Chitralekha Zutshi, a distinguished historian of Kashmir, in the course of a review 
essay looking at a spate of recent literature on Kashmir. 25  Zutshi devotes a 
substantial section of her article to the book, asserting that its account of the violence 
in the Kashmir Valley in 1947 ‘adds a significant chapter to the historiography of the 
independence of India, from which Kashmir is usually absent’. She endorses the value 
of the accounts of survivors and others with first-hand memories of Kashmir in 1947, 
but challenges two incidental aspects of the book’s argument. These are the link 
suggested between events in October 1947 and the more recent crisis in Kashmir and 
the argued longstanding affinity of Afghans for Kashmir which is evidenced as part of 
the explanation for the invasion by a tribal force from close to the border with 
Afghanistan. Zutshi goes on to state: 
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The importance of the book lies not in drawing a connection between the tribal 
incursion in 1947 and the current crisis in Kashmir, but rather in its detailed, 
meticulous, and objective discussion of the events of 1947, which adds much to 
our knowledge about the causes and mechanics of the tribal invasion and serves 
to remove some of the confusion surrounding the political situation in Kashmir in 
1947. 
‘The fact that the book explains the situation using the stories and memories of 
people who experienced this attack’, Zutshi states, ‘makes it all the more compelling.’ 
  In the journal Interventions, Gowhar Fazili describes A Mission in Kashmir as ‘an 
attempt at a new way of writing on Kashmir’. He says that ‘it critically examines 
sources and tries to use new discoveries to contest mainstream ideas on the 
accession, the raiders and the role of Pakistani regulars in the debacle.’26 Fazili argues 
that the focus on the attack on the Baramulla mission, which necessarily relies heavily 
on the voices of non-Kashmiris, is however not the ideal starting point for a wider 
consideration of how Kashmiris experienced the events of 1947:  
its attempt to try to understand Kashmir through this event … is half-hearted. 
[Whitehead] might have done better by including more narratives from ordinary 
local people whose lives were permanently shaped by the circumstances that 
spiralled out of control.   
                                                          
26
 Interventions, 11/1, 2009, pp.131-4 
33 
 
Fazili is right to suggest that more testimony from non-elite Kashmiris would have 
strengthened the narrative. As for the hazards of privileging the attack on the 
Baramulla convent and hospital, the argument is well made – but it is exactly the 
heightened attention on an incident involving Europeans which has allowed this 
incident to be retrieved, through official and clerical records as well as the memories 
of those directly affected. Alongside these pertinent observations, Fazili argues that 
the emphasis apparent in A Mission in Kashmir on retrieving the lived experience of 
Kashmiris and those outsiders who had a stake in events there can be of wider 
scholarly value. His review concludes: ‘Perhaps Whitehead’s narrative will open up 
possibilities for paying more heed to Kashmiri voices through the study of other 
institutions and events in Kashmir in which Kashmiris are central, and reopen 
questions assumed to be settled, through comparable scholarship.’ 
  The testimony recited in A Mission in Kashmir, and the arguments advanced, have 
received considerable attention in expert and scholarly writing. Owen Bennett Jones, 
in the latest edition of his account of Pakistan’s modern history, draws on the book 
for his account of the Kashmir accession crisis and Jinnah’s response to it.27 Srinath 
Raghavan and David M. Malone make reference to the book in their accounts of 
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Indian foreign policy28, and there are also citations in several articles in academic 
journals.29    
  A Mission in Kashmir, no doubt because written by a journalist and published by a 
mainstream imprint, was widely noticed in the news media. It was fortunate in 
attracting more than twenty reviews, author interviews or substantial mentions in 
the Indian press and being the subject of two half-hour TV discussion and interview 
programmes, one featuring a panel of the author and two distinguished historians, 
Ramchandra Guha and Urvashi Butalia. It was also mentioned favourably in Pakistan’s 
leading English language daily newspaper, Dawn – ‘a seminal book about the complex 
skein of politics, nationalist fervour and communal zealotry laced with a wider global 
dimension of the brewing mess, which dogged the early days of the Kashmir dispute’, 
commented columnist Jawed Naqvi30. Ahead of publication, a substantial feature by 
the author ran in a prominent British broadsheet daily.31  
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  Several of the reviews in the Indian press were written by experts in Kashmir studies. 
Amitabh Mattoo, at the time the vice-chancellor of the University of Jammu, stated: 
‘The account is brilliant and moving, and is first-rate by the standards of both a 
journalist and a social historian.’32 Considering both A Mission in Kashmir and another 
title focussing on Kashmir33, Mattoo argued: 
Ordinary stories that have remained unrecorded can often reveal much more 
than official documents and UN resolutions. The recovery of these accounts may 
not only contribute to generating a richer social history of the land and its people 
that does not privilege just a few, but may eventually also help in the resolution 
of Kashmir’s problems. 
A review by Sheikh Abdullah’s grandson and the third generation of the dynasty to 
serve as chief minister of Indian Kashmir, Omar Abdullah, also argued for the need to 
‘learn from past mistakes’.34 Another important political figure in Jammu and Kashmir, 
Ved Marwah, offered appreciative comment: 
The author is a natural storyteller. But to say this is not to devalue his scholarly 
work based on painstaking research, writings and personal interviews of those 
directly involved in the tragic events. The author narrates the story of this 
tragedy with sensitivity, but without bias.35 
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Dilip Menon, who at the time taught history at Delhi University and was editor of The 
Indian Economic and Social History Review, commented that ‘Whitehead writes in the 
best tradition of popular history combining archival depth with investigative zeal’.36 In 
the left-leaning Frontline, A.G. Noorani, asserted: ‘Integrity is … the hallmark of 
Andrew Whitehead’s work’.37 
  The most substantial review in the Indian press, by the writer and commentator 
Manoj Joshi for the literary journal Biblio, also offered the most considered 
criticism.38 While describing the book as ‘a succinct account of a many-layered 
happening’ which has ‘generated an invaluable archive of oral history himself through 
interviews with surviving contemporaries on all sides of the divide’ and its 
assessments as ‘carefully weighed’ and ‘balanced’, he disputes the authorial position 
as neutral between Indian and Pakistani claims: 
Whitehead is somewhat circumspect on this score and chooses to place the 
official British attitude as that of neutrals. … he does not quite explore that 
British officialdom may have played in encouraging the Pakistani venture. … his 
book does not seem to be informed by … detailed revelations of how British 
officers manipulated the situation to serve their own national interests; or, how 
British officers in the Indian and Pakistani army coordinated their efforts to check 
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Indian forces from recapturing that sliver of land that is today called Azad [that is, 
Pakistan-administered] Kashmir. 
A Mission in Kashmir explicitly avoided seeking to disentangle the detailed diplomacy 
surrounding and underlying the early stages of Kashmir dispute, which has been the 
subject of a great deal of contested scholarship. Manoj Joshi’s argument, however, is 
arresting. On a couple of occasions in the aftermath of the book’s publication, leading 
scholars of South Asia commented informally that only someone other than an Indian 
or Pakistani (or by implication a Kashmiri) would have been able to have access to the 
range of testimony achieved. That is a sad but probably accurate reflection on the 
persistent politicisation of the study of Kashmir’s modern history. Yet when Britain is 
held by some parties to the conflict to be at least partly culpable for the failure to 
resolve Kashmir’s future status as the British Raj ended in August 1947, it is perhaps 
understandable, if unwarranted, that a British national whose familiarity with 
Kashmir sprang from working for a British government funded news organisation is 
seen as pulling punches over Britain’s involvement in the inception of the Kashmir 
conflict. 
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6. Subsequent writing on Kashmir’s modern history 
In seeking the opinion of a leading scholar of Kashmir about work conducted since A 
Mission in Kashmir’s publication into related themes, she advised: ‘Unfortunately, 
there is so little writing on Kashmir in the 1940s, especially since the publication of 
your book. …  There is simply no other work that deals with the actual experiences of 
people on the ground in Kashmir in and around 1947 apart from your book that I can 
think of.’39  
  The most substantial recent writing about the origins of the Kashmir conflict is by 
the Australian scholar Christopher Snedden40. In the first section of his book The 
Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir (‘azad’ means ‘free’, and Azad Kashmir is 
the name given to part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir now under 
Pakistan’s administration), Snedden seeks to develop ‘a new perspective about who 
started the dispute about the international status of Jammu and Kashmir’. He argues 
that an uprising in Poonch in the west of Jammu province in the summer of 1947 was 
the start of the armed revolt against Kashmir’s maharaja, predating and encouraging 
the tribal invasion. He sees this as demonstrating that the armed campaign against 
the maharaja, and indirectly against Kashmir’s prospective accession to India, was 
instigated by citizens of the princely state, and not by outsiders. This challenges the 
Indian account that the invading force of Pukhtoon ‘raiders’ from Pakistan started the 
fighting.  
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  While Snedden’s argument is not entirely original, and is based on no new source 
material, its emphasis on the actions of the people of Jammu province in 1947 is a 
useful corrective to established accounts of the origins of the Kashmir conflict. The 
Poonch revolt has, however, been discussed in some detail elsewhere – indeed it 
features in my own writing41 – and while it certainly erupted ahead of the tribal 
invasion, it was nothing like so potent a military threat. While the insurgents in 
western Jammu province quickly gained control over rural areas, they failed to take 
Poonch town, never threatened the city of Jammu and were of little consequence as 
far as control over the heartland of the princely state, the Kashmir valley, was 
concerned. Snedden’s book does not occasion a fundamental rethink of the origins of 
the Kashmir conflict and so is not as revisionist as he suggests. Another argument that 
he addresses is more successfully made – pointing out the ‘inherent disunity’ of 
Jammu and Kashmir which made it close to impossible for the princely state to 
remain undivided through the processes unleashed by India’s Partition. 
   Another book largely about Kashmir in 1947 offers much detailed argument, but 
much less in the way of fresh interpretation. Shabir Choudhry, a founder member of 
the secular nationalist and pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, 
seeks to demonstrate that legally Kashmir became an independent sovereign state 
with the end of British paramountcy over princely states on 15th August 1947. He also 
repeats a much-stated argument that the viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, intervened to 
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ensure that the Radcliffe boundary commission awarded most of Muslim-majority 
Gurdaspur to India rather than Pakistan, so strengthening India’s claim to Kashmir.42 
Neither case is convincing. The book focuses almost entirely on politics and diplomacy, 
and doesn’t discuss the tribal army’s invasion in October 1947 and the Kashmiri 
response to it. 
  The absence of any rigorous biography of the key Kashmir figures of the 1940s has 
constrained a full understanding of the personal alliances and rivalries which were 
such an important factor in the 1947 accession drama. This was mitigated in part by 
the publication in 2008 of Ajit Bhattacharjea’s study of Sheikh Abdullah, by far the 
most commanding Kashmiri political figure of the last century.43 Bhattarcharjea, one 
of India’s most respected journalists, met Sheikh Abdullah both in his prime and 
towards the end of his life and he offers a balanced and authoritative account, 
though marred by a muted discussion of his political motivation, and the conspicuous 
absence of any consideration of personality and personal life. Akbar Jehan, Abdullah’s 
politically influential wife, is mentioned only three times in the book’s index. This is in 
part because Bhattacharjea had only limited access to important archives – he 
laments in his introduction that he ‘continued to be denied permission to see the 
crucial correspondence between Nehru and the Sheikh’44 – and apparently no access 
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to any Abdullah family papers. Sheikh Abdullah still awaits the biography he deserves, 
and that historians of Kashmir require. 
  Sheikh Abdullah’s granddaughter is the author of one of the more interesting recent 
works about Kashmir. Nyla Ali Khan is an academic in the United States. Her study of 
the gender aspect of the Kashmir conflict is enriched by interviews with participants 
in Kashmiri politics and civil society, and is the first recent book length study of the 
subject.45 The book is dedicated to the author’s grandparents – enough, in a Kashmiri 
context, to raise issues about political impartiality – and is diminished by an at times 
deeply emotive style of writing. While the focus of Nyla Ali Khan’s work is 
contemporary Kashmir, her book contains a useful consideration of attitudes to 
gender in the National Conference (Sheikh Abdullah’s political party) in the 1940s – 
including an account of the militia raised in 1947 to protect Srinagar, and in particular 
of its women’s wing.  
  The representation of Kashmir in literature and popular culture, and the means by 
which it came to be a ‘territory of desire’ in competing nationalist discourses, is the 
theme of a particularly innovative study by Ananya Jahanara Kabir.46 This discusses 
cultural expressions of and about Kashmir ranging from the poem ‘Country without a 
Post Office’ by the Kashmiri writer Agha Shahid Ali to the Bollywood action movie 
‘Mission Kashmir’, both in different ways examining Kashmiri national identity.  
                                                          
45
 Nyla Ali Khan, Islam, Women and Violence: between India and Pakistan, New Delhi: Tulika, 2009  
46
 Ananya Jahanara Kabir. Territory of Desire: representing the valley of Kashmir, Minneapolis: U. of 
Minnesota Press, 2009 
42 
 
  The Conservative Member of Parliament Kwasi Kwarteng selects Kashmir as one of 
six post-Imperial areas of tension or conflict which he examines as aspects of an 
‘improvised’ and so flawed approach to the accrual and administration of Britain’s 
Empire.47 He offers a well informed account of the career and eccentricities of 
Kashmir’s last maharaja, and while he is less convincing about Britain’s culpability for 
the enduring Kashmir crisis and has little new to say about the events of 1947, he 
offers a shrewd account of those months and their broader significance: 
By the end of 1947, both Pakistan and India felt that it made sense for the 
Kashmiris themselves to decide to which country they should belong. The fact 
that no plebiscite ever took place to resolve the Kashmir dispute belies some of 
the wilder claims that democracy was the British Raj’s unique legacy to the 
Indian subcontinent; the Kashmir dispute was a direct consequence of princely 
rule, and no democratic resolution to the conflict has ever been sought.48  
A further sign of the vitality of Kashmir studies has been the publication of a volume 
of seventeen academic papers about aspects of Kashmiri literature, culture, religious 
practice and history involving scholars from around the world, including two who 
teach at the University of Kashmir as well as academics at Indian, American, British, 
German, Dutch and Swiss universities (though not from Pakistani institutions).49 
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  Looking more broadly at recent academic literature, the most arresting 
development in Kashmir studies has been the suggestion by Chitralekha Zutshi that 
Kashmir can usefully be theorised as a borderland50, a concept developed in the 
context of North American history and now more widely applied. She suggests that 
Kashmir’s position on the edge of several Empires (Mughal, Afghan, Sikh, Russian, 
British), and the cultural and commercial currents that have arisen from that along 
with the formally or informally negotiated political accommodations, has promoted a 
syncretic identity typical of borderlands. In recent decades, Zutshi argues, the 
introduction of more rigid borders and ceasefire lines has constrained that sense of 
Kashmir as ‘a middle ground’: 
So one can argue that it is in fact Kashmir’s geographical location that has 
allowed it to participate in several different cultural milieus at once and it is 
precisely because it is now partitioned between several states that no longer 
allow for an interchange of ideas, goods and people that it is at the centre of an 
acute political crisis. As a result, greater cross-border exchanges, legitimized by 
the political entities on all sides, are a crucial element of any foreseeable 
settlement to this seemingly intractable problem.51 
Once again, a key concern of expert writing on Kashmir is the continuing territorial 
dispute, and the human agony and cultural disruption that has accompanied it for 
more than sixty years. 
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  The concept of Kashmir as a borderland has also been used by the Canadian scholar 
Cabeiri deBergh Robinson, who offers ‘an anthropological analysis of the social 
production of jihad among refugees who occupy a transnational space in the 
borderlands between Pakistan and India’.52 Her extensive fieldwork has been 
conducted largely among Kashmiri communities in Pakistan (including Azad Kashmir), 
and is informed by her understanding of the commencement and development of the 
dispute over Kashmir. Her own description of the early stages of what Kashmiris style 
as ‘the Kashmir problem’ is based largely on secondary sources, though her brief 
account of the massacre of Muslims in Jammu in late 1947 draws on a wider range of 
source material. She makes the distinction between Partition refugees, whose move 
was seen as irrevocable, and Kashmiri refugees, who were and are notionally 
expected to return and resume ownership of their property. Robinson emphasises 
the large numbers displaced by the conflict – in 1949 almost a fifth of those who had 
been subjects of the princely state had been displaced. Many of those from Jammu 
province moved across the international border into Pakistan while many from 
Kashmir province remained within the bounds of the princely state but found 
themselves on the other side of the ceasefire line, in many ways a more impermeable 
border.  
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  Robinson’s account of her decision to pursue anthropology as a career is particularly 
arresting. In 1995-6, she worked in Indian Kashmir on a humanitarian mission - but, 
she adds: 
I decided to complete my training as an anthropologist rather than become a 
professional humanitarian worker because my observations in the detention 
centers [in Indian Kashmir] convinced me that peacemaking in the Kashmir 
region would eventually have to grapple with the ways that experiences of 
violence have been incorporated into the political cultures of the regions that are 
a part of the Kashmir Dispute.53 
Although not a historian, Robinson is particularly adept in examining how the past has 
shaped Kashmiri culture and attitudes to militancy. 
 
  The phases of the Kashmir conflict have influenced the rhythm of public discussion 
of Kashmir, above all in India. In the last few years, an organised insurgency has 
largely given way to mass street protests, what many Kashmiri activists term an 
‘intifada’, which has provoked an at times brutal response from police and the Indian 
military. While the Indian security apparatus would argue that this represents the 
eclipse of Pakistan-based militant groups, among Indian intellectuals the emergence 
of mass demonstrations, and the sight of stone throwing crowds of young Kashmiris 
confronting heavily armed security forces, has prompted a reassessment of the 
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generally held view that Kashmiri rebelliousness was simply the creation of a 
malevolent Pakistan.  
  The novelist and activist Arundhati Roy has been the most high profile of Indian 
advocates of allowing Kashmiris the right to determine their own future. In recent 
years, other prominent Indian voices have also echoed this view. The influential 
columnist Swaminathan Aiyar, writing in the Times of India in 2008, contrasted the 
(almost) India-wide celebration of independence day with protests on that same day 
in Kashmir against what was perceived there as ‘Indian colonialism in the Valley’. He 
asserted that ‘India seeks to integrate with Kashmir, not rule it colonially. Yet, the 
parallels between British rule in India and Indian rule in Kashmir have become too 
close for my comfort.’54 A small number of senior journalists and public intellectuals 
chimed in, and wrote of the futility of holding by force a territory where the populace 
appeared to want to break away from Indian rule. This allowed space for a wider 
debate, which has also found expression in several books intended for a general 
readership consisting of articles – research, reportage, polemic – which have 
encouraged a more critical look at India’s policy towards Kashmir and a greater 
appreciation of Kashmiri history and culture.55 
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  Alongside these new expressions of informed interest in Kashmir, encouraging this 
process and also nurtured by it, have been the first writings by Kashmiri Muslims 
about the last twenty years of the conflict to reach a significant global audience. The 
reportage of Basharat Peer and the fiction of Mirza Waheed have arguably done 
more to alert international attention to the continuing instability in Kashmir and the 
grave violations of human rights than any number of acts of violence.56 By the quality 
and humanity of their writing, they have helped to establish a sense of the complexity 
of Kashmir issue.  
  The established nationalist narratives about Kashmir are slowly being challenged 
and chipped away. Yet the geopolitical faultline Sister Emilia and her fellow 
missionaries in Baramulla saw taking shape around them in October and November 
1947 remains unbreached. The nature of the conflict has changed greatly over the 
intervening decades, but it has never gone away – and is unlikely to until there is a 
broader understanding of the underlying issues, including how the conflict began. 
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Conclusion 
The particular achievement of A Mission in Kashmir has been to establish an account 
of the origins of the conflict which weaves in the personal, including the Kashmiri 
experience of that time, with an account of a moment of political crisis and military 
confrontation. It uses the voices of those often excluded from historical narrative to 
develop a more complete account of a complex historical moment. It challenges the 
established Indian narrative of the crisis by confounding the official account of 
Kashmir’s accession, demonstrating an initial undertow of support for the Pakistani 
tribal army, and documenting the new Indian government’s insistence that it would 
only rule Kashmir with the consent of its people; it contradicts the official Pakistani 
account by rehearsing the evidence of the complicity of sections of the country’s 
military and political leadership in the tribal army’s advance into Kashmir, establishing 
the extent of the indiscipline of this force and the actions taken to redress that, and 
providing an account of the active volunteer mobilisation in Srinagar to keep the 
invaders at bay; it disputes what might be described as the Kashmiri nationalist 
approach to the events of 1947, and in particular the princely state’s accession to 
India, by demonstrating the vigour with which Sheikh Abdullah and his supporters, 
who were opponents of princely rule, endorsed the decision to accede to India. My 
work also looks on the effective end of princely rule in the Kashmir valley not simply 
as India’s acquisition of the state, but as a moment of profound change involving a 
mass political mobilisation, when for the first time in almost four centuries a Kashmiri 
Muslim achieved political authority in Srinagar.  
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  The use of neutral language, absence of political partiality, and care taken to 
embrace the voices, accounts and perspectives of all who had a stake in Kashmir’s 
future has achieved the signal success that A Mission in Kashmir has not been 
repudiated by any significant body of opinion. This doesn’t mean that there is now an 
agreed narrative on how the Kashmir conflict first took hold, but it is a step towards 
that goal. Neither journalists nor historians should set out with the aim of being 
peace makers, and their writing should not be shaped by a desire to promote any 
particular political or diplomatic outcome, but I hope a more informed discussion of 
how Kashmir succumbed to conflict in 1947 might in some measure help more 
purposeful discussion towards a settlement.  
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The People’s Militia: Communists and 
Kashmiri nationalism in the 1940s 
Andrew Whitehead 
 
‘The people’s movement of Kashmir’, declared the British 
communist Rajani Palme Dutt in the summer of 1946, ‘is the 
strongest and most militant of any Indian State … Its leader, 
Sheikh Abdulla [sic], impressed me as one of the most honest, courageous 
and able political leaders I had the pleasure of seeing in India.’1 
This was warm praise from the austere Palme Dutt. His week-long 
stay in the Kashmiri capital, Srinagar, in July 1946 came at the end of 
a five month visit to India which was intended largely to guide and 
instruct the Communist Party of India (CPI).
2
 It arose from a 
personal invitation from Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the National 
Conference, the main nationalist party in princely-ruled Kashmir. By 
the time Dutt reached the Kashmir Valley, Abdullah had been arrested 
for leading a mass protest campaign against the maharaja. The same 
issue of Dutt’s Labour Monthly that published the account of his trip 
to Kashmir also carried Sheikh Abdullah’s speech in his own defence 
at a trial in which he was sentenced to three years imprisonment for 
making seditious speeches.
3
 
 
  Dutt, the British-born son of a Bengali doctor, was a doctrinaire 
exponent of orthodoxy within the leadership of the Communist Party 
of Great Britain (CPGB).
4
 In the British party, he was more feared 
than loved; in the Indian party, his stock was much higher. Palme 
Dutt’s India To-Day, a huge book first published in 1940 at which 
time the author had never set foot in India, was enormously influential 
there. Dutt acted as mentor to the younger party, and the CPI 
leadership would have taken careful note of his comment that 
Kashmir was ‘the political storm-centre of the Indian fight for 
freedom’. In his Labour Monthly article, Dutt made much of the 
resemblance of the National Conference
5
 emblem, a red flag with 
plough, to the red flag with hammer and sickle which flew over the 
bonnet of his car on the arduous road journey from Rawalpindi to 
Srinagar. In the Kashmiri capital, under the thrall of what he 
described as a ‘reign of terror’ established by the maharaja, he 
attended Sheikh Abdullah’s trial: 
 
the sympathy even among the soldiers and armed guards for 
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Abdulla was visible. When Abdulla entered the court, the entire 
court with the exception of the judge stood up in his honour – 
which was more than they had done for the judge. He saw me as 
he entered and moved away from his guards to shake me by the 
hand, and we exchanged greetings and I was able publicly to 
express to him the admiration and support felt for his stand. The 
proceedings were held up till we had completed these greetings. 
 
A few days later, Dutt button-holed Jawaharlal Nehru, a friend and 
ally of Abdullah, to advise him against ‘letting down the Kashmir 
fight’. By the end of the following year, Nehru had become the first 
prime minister of independent India and Sheikh Abdullah was in 
power in what had become Indian Kashmir. 
 
  Rajani Palme Dutt’s ringing endorsement of Sheikh Abdullah and 
the movement against autocracy in Kashmir both reflected and gave 
impetus to Indian communist activity in this out-of-the-way valley in 
the Himalayan foothills. Communists helped to shape Sheikh 
Abdullah’s radical campaign against princely rule. In turn, Palme Dutt, 
it has been suggested, saw in the mass action in Kashmir a potential 
model for left campaigns, midway between insurrectionism and the 
restraint advocated by Nehru’s Indian National Congress.6 Yet in the 
year following Dutt’s visit to Srinagar, communists in Kashmir took the 
lead in organising a popular armed force. Hundreds of young Kashmiris 
enrolled in the militia, and some saw active service while helping to 
repulse an invasion by pro-Pakistan irregular forces. The militia bore 
such leftist imprints as political officers, a women’s wing, and a linked 
cultural front staging popular dramas and organising propaganda. 
 
  The establishment of a volunteer force was a remarkable innovation 
in a part of India where there was no martial tradition. The 
involvement of women in the militia was even more of a breach with 
convention in such a conservative region, with little space for women 
in public life. For Indian communists, too, this was new territory. The 
party had little history of armed activity, and was sharply critical 
during the Second World War of Subhas Chandra Bose’s Indian 
National Army, a force raised outside Indian soil which fought alongside 
Japanese troops. The militia in Kashmir was a revolutionary force 
– part of a political mobilisation which saw a new political order take 
shape there. Sheikh Abdullah’s advent to power marked the end of 
more than a century of princely rule, and he became the first 
Kashmiri Muslim to hold the reins of power for well over three 
hundred years. The volunteer force, however, was not a challenge to 
the newly independent Indian state; rather it was established to 
support Kashmir’s accession to India and was equipped and trained by 
the Indian army. It was a defence force, intended to safeguard the 
Kashmiri capital from a very real threat of occupation and ransacking 
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by armed Pakistani tribesmen, rather than a propagator of insurgency. 
When after a few weeks the immediate danger to Srinagar abated, so 
too did the temper of militia activity. The women’s section disbanded, 
and the men’s militia was eventually incorporated into the Indian 
armed forces. 
 
  Kashmir had not been a focus of communist activity prior to the 
mid-1940s, and it largely disappeared from the party’s horizons 
within months of Sheikh Abdullah’s political takeover. When at the 
close of 1947 the CPI moved towards a policy of promoting a popular 
uprising in southern India, this amounted to a repudiation of the 
policy pursued in Kashmir. The communist approach to Kashmiri 
nationalism in the mid-1940s harked back to the Popular Front 
period – a practice of working within progressive parties which had 
mass support. Although communists in Kashmir made no secret of 
their political allegiances, they did not seek to organise as a separate 
party. Their influence within the National Conference was considerable, 
and endured into the early years of Sheikh Abdullah’s period in 
office. As well as their leadership of the militia, communists also 
shaped an exceptionally radical political programme with the ‘New 
Kashmir’ manifesto of 1944. The land reform measures outlined in 
the manifesto were eventually implemented, and are widely seen as 
one of the most radical and successful measures of political and social 
empowerment in South Asia. This article looks at the means by which 
communists gained influence within the Kashmiri nationalist 
movement, the nature of the militia which it helped to establish, and 
the reasons for the failure to develop a mass-based communist 
movement. 
 
                                               * * * 
 
The mountain valley of Kashmir was ‘great game’ territory, part of 
that inaccessible region of Asia where China, Tibet, Russia and the 
British Raj all met. The principality of Jammu and Kashmir took 
shape from the mid-1840s. A century later it was the biggest by area, 
and second biggest by population, of all India’s princely states. The 
ruling family were Dogri-speaking Hindus from Jammu – in other 
words, outsiders in the eyes of many Kashmiris – who managed to 
agglomerate, though never quite bind together, a huge area stretching 
north from the Punjab plains, through valleys in the Himalayan 
foothills, to some of the high mountain ranges. The Kashmir Valley 
was the heartland of their fiefdom, though it accounted for well under 
half of the princely state’s total population and less than a tenth of the 
land area. It was the centre of the Kashmiri language and culture and 
of a tolerant Sufi-influenced form of Islam, the religion of more than 
ninety per cent of the Valley’s population. The maharajas were, by and 
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large, wealthy, sporting Anglophiles. They presided over an autocracy 
where the Muslim majority was disadvantaged, facing heavy taxes and 
other feudal-style impositions and with little prospect of education or 
advancement.
7
 
 
  The opening of the Jhelum valley road in 1890 for the first time 
allowed access to Srinagar by wheeled transport and started to chip 
away at Kashmir’s political and intellectual isolation. From the 
1920s, increasing numbers of civil servants and army officers 
descended on Srinagar during the summer to escape the blistering 
heat of the plains. There was travel in the other direction too. The 
offspring of Kashmir’s tiny Muslim middle class started to secure an 
education in Punjab or further afield. From the beginning of the 
1930s, popular politics began to take root in the Kashmir Valley, and 
achieved some concessions from autocratic princely rule. 
Newspapers and public gatherings for political purposes were 
permitted from 1932. From the start, the example of the Russian 
Revolution loomed large in the thinking of Kashmir’s small group of 
politically minded youngsters. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the son 
of a shawl maker, was the most prominent Kashmiri political leader 
from the early 1930s until his death in 1982.
8
 
 
  Sheikh Abdullah was a graduate of Lahore and Aligarh universities 
and a charismatic leader and orator who rejoiced in the title 
Sher-e-Kashmir: the lion of Kashmir. The initial political mobilisation, 
in the face of often severe repression, was largely communal. 
Sheikh Abdullah’s party was initially known as the Muslim 
Conference, but in 1939 it was renamed the National Conference, 
marking an important turn from a community-based identity to 
aspiring to represent all Kashmiris. The party made an open appeal 
for support from the Kashmir Valley’s small but influential Hindu 
and Sikh minorities. From the late 1930s, Sheikh Abdullah developed 
a strong bond with two of South Asia’s commanding 
nationalist leaders: Jawaharlal Nehru, who was himself of Kashmiri 
Hindu ancestry, and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known as the 
‘Frontier Gandhi’, who like Abdullah was an inspirational, secularminded 
leader in an overwhelmingly Muslim region. This was an 
alliance of progressive nationalists, who courted popular support 
and were willing to tackle feudal privilege. Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s 
Muslim League and its allies, the political forces which secured the 
creation in 1947 of the explicitly Muslim nation of Pakistan, had 
significant support in the Kashmir Valley, but never managed to 
rival Sheikh Abdullah’s mass appeal. 
 
  There was another factor encouraging and sustaining Sheikh 
Abdullah’s turn to a more socialist-minded style of politics. Leftleaning 
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intellectuals from Lahore began to congregate in Srinagar. 
Some came during the summer; others settled there. As the temper of 
politics in Kashmir quickened, so did their interest and involvement. 
In 1941, Sheikh Abdullah himself performed the nikah or Muslim 
marriage ceremony in Srinagar of his friend, the renowned progressive 
poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz, and a London communist, Alys George. Her 
sister Christobel was already married to a prominent Punjabi marxist, 
M.D. Taseer, who became the principal of Kashmir’s most prestigious 
college of higher education. Her memoir of the Valley includes a 
group photograph of a remarkable constellation of coming leftist 
literary talent, among them Faiz and the novelist Mulk Raj Anand, 
taken in Kashmir in 1938.
9
 Most were close to the CPI and several 
came to be active in the Progressive Writers’ Association or the Indian 
People’s Theatre Association, organisations of enormous influence in 
Indian literature and cinema. The actor and writer Balraj Sahni, a 
party member, was also an influential figure, and the family home in 
Srinagar was another gathering place of left cultural figures. ‘Since I 
had come from Bombay, where the Central Office of the Communist 
Party was,’ Sahni wrote, ‘the Srinagar comrades used to treat me with 
a deference, which was out of all proportion.’10 
 
  Another communist couple began to travel up from Lahore and 
came to be key players in Kashmiri politics. B.P.L. Bedi was a Punjabi 
Sikh who as a student at Oxford had met a woman from Derbyshire, 
Freda Houlston. ‘Barely a week after finishing Final Schools’, she 
reminisced, ‘we were married in the dark and poky little Oxford 
Registry Office.’11 She wore a sari as her wedding dress, and in the 
autumn of 1934, the Bedis and their four-month-old baby moved to 
India. They were a striking couple, politically committed and socially 
outgoing, and to this day warmly remembered by the few survivors of 
their once large circle of friends. ‘In the summer months’, reminisced 
Christobel Bilqees Taseer, ‘the Leftists from different parts of India 
would also be there [in Kashmir], mixing with and influencing the 
National Conference workers. One particularly popular couple were 
the Bedis … Both husband and wife were dedicated Marxists.’12 
‘Baba’ Bedi was gregarious and forceful – ‘very funny character, very 
happy go lucky type … he had a big smile on his face’.13 Freda was 
courageous, clever and her beauty was much commented upon. In the 
words of her younger son, the film star Kabir Bedi, ‘she was blue eyed, 
white skinned and fighting the British’.14 They became close friends 
of Sheikh Abdullah and part of his immediate political circle. 
 
                                               * * * 
 
Organised CPI activity in the Kashmir Valley appears to date from the 
late 1930s. Prem Nath Bazaz, who was both a historian of and a 
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participant in Kashmir politics in this era, recorded that two 
‘Moscow-trained’ workers from Lahore spent several weeks in 
Srinagar in 1937 but achieved little. In the early 1940s, several small 
socialist-minded discussion groups were set up by students in 
Kashmir.
15
 In this more propitious climate, the CPI made another 
attempt to recruit. ‘In September 1942, Fazal Elahi Qurban, the well 
known Communist from Lahore organized an anti fascist school in a 
house boat in Srinagar’, according to an Indian intelligence report, 
‘and the party’s influence was slowly being extended.’16 Pran Nath 
Jalali, a schoolboy at the time, attended the sessions: ‘I ran away from 
my home to join the first study circle, they called it, which was held 
in Dal Lake. It was in a boat. We had the first schooling on communist 
ideology in that doonga [boat].’17 
 
  Jalali had expected to be taught how to make bombs, but instead 
learned about topics ranging from evolution to the French 
Revolution. He recalled about fourteen participants in the classes, 
most of them students.
18
 Among those attending were two future 
chief ministers of Indian Kashmir and key lieutenants of Sheikh 
Abdullah. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s association with the communist 
movement was brief. G.M. Sadiq’s links were much more long 
lasting.
19
 Small numbers of communists became active particularly 
within the students, youth and labour wings of the National 
Conference. ‘They did not raise their hand that here we are, communists’, 
Pran Nath Jalali recalled. ‘Except that everybody knew. Even 
Sheikh sahib [Sheikh Abdullah] knew … There was no ban as such. 
But we were conscious not to run Sheikh sahib on the wrong side 
because he was very sensitive about any parallel political activity.’ 
 
  A disproportionate number of these pioneer Kashmiri communists 
were, like Jalali, Pandits – that is, high caste Kashmiri speaking 
Hindus, a community which at that time made up less than a tenth 
of the Valley’s population. One Pandit communist, Niranjan Nath 
Raina, achieved prominence both within the National Conference in 
Srinagar and in the local trade union movement. ‘I admired him 
because he had great intellect … he was a man of calibre’, recalled 
Mohan Lal Misri; ‘he was the number one communist’ in the recollection 
of Mahmooda Ahmed Ali Shah.
20
 Raina ‘had been 
indoctrinated with the philosophy of communism while studying in 
the Allahabad University’, recorded Prem Nath Bazaz. ‘On his return 
to his homeland he became the staunchest propagandist of the creed. 
Through his efforts, the party gained dozens of adherents among the 
intelligentsia of the Pandits.’21 Nevertheless, Kashmiri communism 
was a secular movement which sought to embrace all communities, 
with secularism at the root of its political purpose. 
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  The most powerful evidence of communist influence within the 
National Conference came with the party’s adoption in September 
1944 of the ‘Naya Kashmir’ (New Kashmir) policy document. 
According to some of those involved, communist allies of Sheikh 
Abdullah had urged the National Conference to develop a policy 
platform. ‘In order to get it in a concrete shape’, one veteran 
commented many decades later, ‘the National Conference party 
invited from its members their opinions, articles, suggestions and 
view-points, all in writing. When a bulk of such material was 
collected, it was sifted and all good things accepted, compiled and 
given a proper shape. It was then prepared into a well arranged 
document with the help of a communist leader, B.L.P. [sic] Bedi who 
… mixed his own ideological substance with the material.’22 Most 
accounts agree that Bedi was responsible for the greater part of the 
forty-four-page manifesto, perhaps in collaboration with prominent 
CPI members in Lahore. Jalali’s recollection is that apart from the 
introduction, there wasn’t much writing to do, because the manifesto 
was ‘almost a carbon copy’ of documents issued in Soviet Central 
Asia.
23
 
 
  The ‘New Kashmir’ manifesto has been authoritatively described as 
‘the most important political document in modern Kashmir’s 
history’.24 In the introduction, Sheikh Abdullah advocated democracy 
and responsible government for Kashmir and a planned economy, 
and made clear where he looked for inspiration: 
 
In our times, Soviet Russia has demonstrated before our eyes, not 
merely theoretical but in her actual day to day life and development, 
that real freedom takes birth only from economic 
emancipation. The inspiring picture of the regeneration of all the 
different nationalities and peoples of the U.S.S.R., and their 
welding together into the united mighty Soviet State that is 
throwing back its barbarous invaders with deathless heroism, is an 
unanswerable argument for the building of democracy on the 
cornerstone of economic equality. 
 
There was certainly no shortage of rhetoric. The preamble to what 
was in effect a draft constitution asserted the determination of the 
people of Jammu and Kashmir to ‘raise ourselves and our children 
forever from the abyss of oppression and poverty, degradation and 
superstition, from medieval darkness and ignorance, into the sunlit 
valleys of plenty ruled by freedom, science and honest toil, in worthy 
participation of the historic resurgence of the peoples of the East … 
to make this our country a darzling [sic] gem upon the snowy bosom 
of Asia’.25 The socialist tone was emphasised by the front cover, red in 
hue, with a Marianne-style depiction of a woman, her head covered, 
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holding the National Conference red flag. 
 
  The body of the document was much more earnest, incorporating 
charters for workers, peasants and women. It advocated equal rights, 
irrespective of race, religion, nationality or birth. Freedom of speech, 
press and assembly were to be guaranteed. There was particular 
emphasis on rights for women, which extended to equal wages and 
paid leave during pregnancy. The main features of the National 
Economic Plan were the ‘abolition of landlordism’ and ‘land to the 
tiller’, radical measures in any country but exceptionally so in an 
underdeveloped and partly feudal principality. All key industries were 
to be ‘managed and owned by the Democratic State of Jammu and 
Kashmir’. The draft constitution proposed universal suffrage for those 
aged eighteen and over, though the powers of the National Assembly 
were to be subject ‘to the general control of H.H. the Maharaja 
Bahadur’. This tolerance of a constitutional monarchy, a deference 
sharply at odds with the democratic tone of the programme, was 
further reflected in the decision of the National Conference to present 
their policy document in person to the maharaja. 
 
  ‘One thing that is difficult to understand is that the programme 
was not produced in a high tide of mass upsurge’, wrote the Kashmiri 
communist, N.N. Raina. ‘On the contrary political activity in 1943- 
44 had fallen to its lowest ebb … There was an air of unreality about 
the whole operation.’ Yet the ‘New Kashmir’ programme, Raina 
argued, pointed the way for the National Conference and allowed it 
to establish a mass base, and also found a wider audience for communist 
ideas. ‘By the summer of 1945 the number of copies of People’s 
War, [a] weekly run by the C.P.I. sold every week [in Kashmir] 
reached 270’, he wrote. ‘This was in addition to about 100 permanent 
subscribers … A few tens were communists by conviction and 
were National Conference office bearers at various levels.’26 
 
 
                                               * * * 
 
While ‘New Kashmir’ countenanced the continuance of princely rule 
in some form, the memorandum the National Conference submitted 
to a British cabinet mission to India in early 1946 took a more 
militant tone. In this, the party took strong exception to the terms of 
the treaty a century earlier, under which a local warlord acquired the 
Kashmir Valley. It was the treaty which had established Dogra 
princely rule over the Valley – and the National Conference now 
demanded what amounted to its annulment: ‘We wish to declare that 
no sale deed however sacrosanct can condemn more than four million 
men and women to servitude of an autocrat when will to live under 
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this rule is no longer there’, Sheikh Abdullah declared in a telegram 
sent to the cabinet mission while they were in Srinagar. ‘People of 
Kashmir are determined to mould their own destiny and we appeal to 
Mission to recognise justice and strength of our cause.’27 
 
  ‘Quit Kashmir’ was a slogan that resounded around the Valley in 
the spring of 1946. It was an echo of the Congress’s ‘Quit India’ 
campaign of a few years earlier. The target of Kashmir’s mass agitation, 
though, was not the British but their own maharaja. The ‘Quit 
Kashmir’ movement seems more formidable in retrospect than it did 
at the time, and provided no immediate threat to princely rule. Yet it 
strengthened Sheikh Abdullah’s political primacy in the Valley, caught 
the mood which was increasingly hostile to the maharaja and his 
family, and wrong-footed rival parties.
28
 It was arguably the biggest 
organised political mobilisation the Kashmir Valley had seen – and 
was the movement that won the attention and applause of Rajani 
Palme Dutt. The concept of the sovereignty of the people which had 
been part-expressed in the ‘New Kashmir’ document was more 
powerfully achieved on the streets. The maharaja responded to the 
threat to his rule with repression. Hundreds of National Conference 
activists were rounded up, and on 20 May 1946, Sheikh Abdullah 
himself was arrested. 
 
  In the face of mass arrests, the communist network helped sustain 
the larger National Conference as an underground political force. 
Several leaders of the National Conference, including Sheikh 
Abdullah’s principal lieutenant Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and the 
leftist G.M. Sadiq, managed to sidestep arrest and reach Lahore. From 
there, they sought to organise protests and publish party literature. 
Ghulam Mohiuddin Kara (or Qarra) – a founder member of the 
National Conference who recounted that in 1942 he had been ‘won 
over to the Communist cause through the Bedis’29 – went underground. 
Kara has been described by a writer not generally sympathetic 
to the National Conference as the hero of the moment. ‘The 
Government strained every nerve and spent large sums of money to 
get him arrested but in vain … He did not hide just to prevent his 
imprisonment but sustained the Movement in Srinagar.’30 The 
American photo-journalist Margaret Bourke-White met Kara at the 
Bedis’ home when she visited Kashmir at the close of 1947 and heard 
stories, legends perhaps, of his underground heroism, and of his affectionate 
nickname of ‘Bulbul-i-Kashmir’, the nightingale of Kashmir.31 
 
  Women filled some of the vacuum left by the arrest or flight of 
male leaders, acting as couriers and also seeking to maintain morale 
and a sense of purpose. Freda Bedi memorably dressed as a local 
Muslim woman to enable her to conduct an ‘underground messenger 
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service’ for the nationalists.32 Kashmiri women gained a prominence 
and confidence that they had never before attained or sought. ‘When 
[the] male leadership was put behind the bars or driven underground’, 
wrote Krishna Misri, herself a young political activist in 
Kashmir in the 1940s, ‘the women leaders took charge and gave a new 
direction to the struggle … However, the leaders addressed no controversial 
woman-specific issues for they did not want to come across as 
social rebels.’33 The leading women activists in Srinagar included the 
pro-communist Mahmooda Ali Shah, who had graduated from Lahore 
and was later a pioneer of women’s education in Kashmir, as well as 
Begum Zainab and Sheikh Abdullah’s wife, Begum Akbar Jehan. 
 
  The Indian communist weekly People’s War paid little attention to 
Kashmir, even when the National Conference adopted a socialist 
policy platform. Its successor People’s Age made good the omission, 
championing the ‘Quit Kashmir’ campaign and lionising Sheikh 
Abdullah. The CPI’s young and popular leader P.C. Joshi described 
Sheikh Abdullah as ‘the wisest and tallest among the State people’s 
leaders’.34 In August 1947, the paper carried a photograph of a ‘giant 
meeting at Hazratbal [outside Srinagar] … addressed by four underground 
National Conference workers’. But when the following 
month, a People’s Age correspondent reported on a stay of several 
weeks in Kashmir, the tone was distinctly critical: ‘The movement at 
present is nearly wholly disorganised and among the rank and file 
workers there is great dissatisfaction and confusion. There is even a 
danger of disintegration.’35 
 
  By then the Raj had ended and British India had been partitioned. 
Nehru had become the first prime minister of independent India, 
while Jinnah was governor-general of the new nation of Pakistan. 
Both were preoccupied by the profound loss of life, communal 
violence, and mass migration that accompanied a hastily executed 
partition. In the initial post-Raj weeks, the Kashmir Valley was largely 
unaffected by communal unrest, but there was great confusion about 
which nation the state would join. In formal terms, the decision 
rested with the maharaja. He was torn between Pakistan’s greater 
indulgence of princely rulers and the ties of religion which bound him 
(but only a minority of his citizens) more closely to India.
36
 The 
maharaja dithered and played for time, and Abdullah and many of his 
supporters were still in jail as India and Pakistan celebrated independence 
in mid-August 1947. 
 
  Sheikh Abdullah was eventually released on 29 September. The 
rejoicing crowds that paraded through Srinagar were testament to his 
popularity and political authority. Within days, Abdullah began to 
make a case for what can only be regarded as a political militia – a 
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startling novelty in Kashmir which had no militia tradition, and 
indeed where no Valley Kashmiris had been allowed to serve in the 
maharaja’s army. Addressing a public meeting, Abdullah called for 
volunteers to come forward to establish a ‘peace brigade’. Referring to 
reports of a possible incursion into Kashmir, he advocated ‘a volunteer 
corps to maintain peace and protect “our hearth and homes”, 
irrespective of creed and community’.37 Whether or not the idea originated 
with communists, they took on themselves the urgent task of 
organising the volunteer force. 
 
  Two weeks after Sheikh Abdullah called for the establishment of a 
peace brigade, the invasion of Kashmir he had warned of began. A 
‘lashkar’ or tribal army, ill-disciplined but well armed and numbering 
several thousand fighters, descended from the tribal agencies 
bordering Afghanistan. They were pursuing a jihad or holy war – and 
as well as championing Islam, they were also seeking to claim the 
Kashmir Valley for Pakistan and (for many the most immediate preoccupation) 
to seek booty. The extent of Pakistan’s complicity in this 
raid has been hotly debated and disputed. It is clear that the provincial 
government in Pakistan’s North-West frontier aided and 
encouraged the invasion, as did some in Pakistan’s national government 
and in the army. Aided by Muslim mutineers within the 
maharaja’s forces, the invaders progressed rapidly, capturing 
Muzaffarabad, advancing along the Jhelum river, and taking the 
Valley’s second town, Baramulla. There the ‘lashkar’ looted and raped, 
and caused an international outcry by ransacking a Catholic convent 
and mission hospital where three Europeans were among those killed. 
Although the targets were often non-Muslims, the attackers were 
indiscriminate in their violence and so lost much of the goodwill they 
might have enjoyed as self-proclaimed liberators from Hindu princely 
rule. 
 
  The fall of Baramulla and word of the atrocities committed there 
caused alarm in Srinagar, just thirty-five miles away on a good and flat 
road. The maharaja, prompted by the Indian government, fled at 
night in a long cavalcade of cars across a mountain pass to the city of 
Jammu. Many Kashmiris saw this as an act of cowardice. Once in 
Jammu, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession by 
which his state became part of India. Sheikh Abdullah was quick to 
endorse Kashmir’s union with India, but he recognised that the most 
urgent task was to repulse the invaders. With the collapse of the state’s 
army and of much of the maharaja’s administration, Srinagar was 
undefended. The Indian government began an ambitious airlift to 
provide some defence for the Kashmiri capital, but Srinagar’s airstrip 
was so basic it was impossible to land more than three or four 
hundred troops a day. 
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  On the day the airlift began, Nehru wrote a private letter endorsing 
the volunteer force Sheikh Abdullah had envisaged. ‘We shall be 
sending you more arms for distribution to the civil population’, he 
told an Indian officer sent as his personal emissary to Srinagar. 
‘Chosen young men, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh, should be given rifles 
and if possible given some simple training. We must do all this on a 
non-communal basis inviting everyone to joining in defence but 
taking care of one major factor – to trust none who might give trouble 
… These armed volunteers can well undertake the defence of, and the 
duty of keeping order in Srinagar and other towns in the Valley … 
This would leave our troops for more active work.’38 
 
  The following day, newspapers reported ‘hundreds of “National 
Conference” volunteers’ in the streets. Two days later, ‘several scores 
of them appeared armed for the first time with standard .303 rifles 
which a spokesman said they had obtained from “friendly sources”’.39 
Sheikh Abdullah reminisced that ‘Hindus and Muslims alike were 
prepared to guard their national honour, having heard about the 
atrocities inflicted on the innocents by the tribal people … Girls also 
joined with the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh boys, and all were strictly 
ordered to guard the non-Muslim households.’40 N.N. Raina, a 
prominent Kashmiri communist, gave a sense of the excitement as 
young Kashmiris enrolled in the militia: 
 
Within a few hours the whole atmosphere in the Valley changed. 
Young and old started marching, and offering for guard duties on 
bridges and in bazaars, banks, telephone and telegraph exchanges 
… The exhibition ground was used for training and lodging of 
volunteers, many of whom were from the Srinagar factories, 
schools and colleges. Gole Bagh was used for training lady volunteers.
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He recounted that military veterans and others with relevant experience 
were brought in to train the volunteers, and cars and motorbikes 
were requisitioned for their transport. 
 
  Although Sheikh Abdullah had been named by the maharaja as 
emergency administrator rather than head of government, he quickly 
took the reins of power. The presence on the streets of a volunteer 
force loyal to him was tangible proof that the old princely order had 
gone. The militia’s task was to protect the Kashmiri capital from the 
Pakistani invaders, and in so doing it buttressed Kashmir’s accession 
to India. Militia members patrolled the streets of Srinagar, and sought 
to defend the main points of entry to the city. A journalist who travelled 
round Srinagar by jeep reported: ‘Every inlet to the city had its 
posse of volunteers, some of whom were armed with guns, others with 
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swords and sticks.’42 In due course, some militia members accompanied 
Indian troops, serving as guides and translators and occasionally 
as combatants. Several members of the militia were killed in the 
fighting. A few volunteers chose to work undercover in areas that had 
been captured by the tribesmen. Among these was Maqbool 
Sherwani, ‘an adventurer and a bit showy’ in the judgement of his 
colleague Pran Nath Jalali, who was shot by tribesmen in Baramulla 
and came to be regarded as a martyred hero of pro-India Kashmiri 
nationalism.
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  While there were many non-communists active in the militia and 
a few in leading positions within it, the predominance of communists 
and their sympathisers indicates the influence of the left within the 
National Conference. The leftist G.M. Sadiq was often described as 
the pioneer and leader of the militia. His sister, Begum Zainab, was 
the guiding force behind the women’s corps. The military commander 
was Said Ahmed Shah, a Muslim also known by the Hindu-style 
name Sham-ji. Colleagues recall him as largely non-political in 
outlook. Rajbans Khanna, a young communist intellectual from 
Lahore and friend of the Sahnis, took a directing role – and in due 
course married one of the women’s militia, Usha Kashyap. The 
teenage communist Pran Nath Jalali was the militia’s political officer, 
a post which bore an echo, by design or otherwise, of the leftist 
International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War a decade earlier. He 
had the task of promoting literacy and political awareness. 
 
  Indian army officers provided a modicum of training, as well as 
some basic equipment. Photographs survive of groups of young 
Kashmiri men drilling and parading, and taking part in rifle practice. 
A children’s wing was formed, the Bal Sena, and a group of enthusiastic 
youngsters was photographed drilling with wooden rifles in the 
centre of Srinagar. The women’s militia was not intended for active 
service. It was a self-defence corps, intended to give Kashmiri women 
of all communities the chance to defend their homes and honour 
should Srinagar be occupied. ‘For them it was a matter of life and 
death’, one National Conference leader recalled, ‘because women and 
wealth were the most coveted targets of the invaders.’44 The women 
drilled (and on one occasion, were inspected with weapons on display 
by Nehru) and some learnt how to fire .303 rifles and throw grenades. 
‘When my instructor shot the first fire, we were so scared we ran 
away’, recalled Krishna Misri, who was fifteen years old when she 
enrolled in the women’s militia.45 The members also helped with relief 
work for the thousands of refugees created by the advent of the tribal 
army and the ensuing panic. 
 
  National Conference leaders suggested that as many as 10,000 
69 
 
young Kashmiris enlisted in the militia. This was probably an exaggeration, 
but many hundreds certainly joined up in what was initially 
known as the Bachau Fauj (Protection Force). While they contributed 
to the repulse of the raiders, their military role was not crucial. Their 
part in maintaining morale and in confirming Sheikh Abdullah’s 
political ascendancy was more emphatic. The tribesmen advanced to 
the outskirts of Srinagar. The capital was without power, fuel and 
newspapers and supplies of food and cooking oil were limited. But the 
attackers had not expected to face the might of the Indian army, 
supported from the air, and within two weeks of the beginning of the 
airlift Indian troops had secured Srinagar and repulsed the tribal 
forces to the edges of the Kashmir Valley. The maharaja was still the 
nominal ruler of Kashmir, but his state forces were almost nonexistent 
and his authority in the Valley was minimal. 
 
  The success of the militia, both in attracting public support and in 
bolstering the National Conference’s public standing, appears to have 
emboldened communists to act more openly. They argued that the 
volunteer force, which was largely restricted to Srinagar, should be 
extended across the state and given an explicit political purpose. ‘Our 
people should feel convinced that they are not fighting merely for the 
continuance of the old oppressive order but their own freedom’, 
stated an open letter from the communist group in the National 
Conference written at the end of October 1947, when the Kashmiri 
capital was still imperilled by the invaders. ‘On the basis of this 
consciousness we should be able to build a patriotic People’s Militia 
which can launch political as well as military offensives to defeat the 
politico-military offensive of the enemy. We should be able to 
organise a network of Village Defence Committees, and thousands of 
Village Militia Units in every corner of the state.’46 
 
  The communist press echoed the demand for an effective militia 
and gloried in its reported successes. At the same time as the communists 
delivered their open message, the People’s Age declared that 
Kashmir’s ‘freedom fight’ could not rely simply on the Indian army. It 
would require ‘the mobilization and active participation of the entire 
following of the National Conference, of the entire common people 
of Kashmir and Jammu. It will be necessary to arm the entire mass 
with whatever weapons one can get, to organise a popular guerilla 
warfare against the raiders.’47 This call to arms was a new direction for 
the CPI, which for much of the Second World War supported the 
allied war effort and was thus opposed to the most formidable of 
Indian wartime irregular forces, the Japan-aligned Indian National 
Army. It was, however, not a call for an insurgency against the Indian 
state, but for a militia which operated in the name of a non-communist 
party and alongside the Indian army. 
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  The following week, the communist weekly reported on the mobilisation 
and activities of the Bachao Fauj, which it said, with boundless 
optimism, numbered 25,000 volunteers. Later in the month, the 
People’s Age gave over its front-page to a series of photographs of the 
militia under the headline: ‘Kashmiris Resist’. An accompanying article 
recounted that ‘these kids who rouse their whole mohalla [district] with 
the spirit of resistance, come every day to the headquarters demanding 
jobs to do, and, of course, rifles to fight the enemy with’. It also 
published a letter from Srinagar (apparently written by Usha Kashyap, 
though her name was not given) giving a sense of the political energy 
in the air: ‘I am writing this letter to you from the Paladium [sic] 
Cinema which is our headquarters now’, she wrote, supposedly to relatives 
in Bombay. ‘Down below at the crossing, thousands of Kashmiris 
are always mounting guard with their rifles. The whole city is mad with 
joy … Today four of us girls will be taught the use of rifles. Tomorrow 
we may be sent to the … front as field-nurses.’48 
 
  The next issue reported the pushing back of the invaders and the 
taking by the Indian army of the key town of Baramulla – which 
meant the lifting of the danger to the Kashmiri capital. The following 
week, the People’s Age devoted two pages to photographs of women 
members of the militia: ‘For the first time on the soil of India is there 
being built an army of women, trained to use the rifle and other 
modern weapons of war’, the paper declared with rhetorical flourish, 
though it was certainly justified in pointing out the striking innovation 
of arming and training women volunteers, all the more 
remarkable in a conservative, mainly Muslim princely state. ‘The 
women in Kashmir are the first in India to build an army of women 
trained to use the rifle. By their example they have made Indian 
history, filled our chests with pride, raised our country’s banner higher 
among the great nations of the world.’49 The prominence in the 
women’s self-defence corps of communist sympathisers, among them 
Mahmooda Ali Shah, Begum Zainab and Sajida Malik, again underlines 
the role of the left in leading and directing this citizen’s militia.50 
 
  Alongside the armed militia, a Cultural Front was instituted, with 
again communists in leading positions – largely to conduct propaganda 
against the tribal raiders and in favour of Sheikh Abdullah and 
his radical policy programme. Simple dramas, what would later be 
called agitprop pieces, were hastily devised and performed: ‘We used 
to go to the front and play the local themes’, recalled Usha Kashyap; 
‘how these raiders, they’ve come to only kill Hindus, they were doing 
all sorts, molesting women and all that. And those plays used to be a 
big, big hit … And my name turned into, instead of Usha, Ayesha, 
Muslim name. And they loved me.’51 
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  ‘In Battle-Scarred Kashmir A People’s Theatre Is Born’ read a 
headline in the People’s Age.52 The article reported that the first two 
dramas had been written and ‘are being rapidly rehearsed’, both 
dwelling on the heroism of the militia volunteers. One told the story 
of Maqbool Sherwani, the motorcycling militia man who had been 
shot dead by the raiders in Baramulla. The other was entitled ‘Sara’, 
portrayed as a ‘true story’ of a young Kashmiri woman who offered to 
cook for the raiders when they entered her village but instead 
informed on them: 
 
And in a short while, the volunteers of the National Militia were 
on the spot. They stormed the house, captured the raiders before 
they knew what to do. The Chief of the raiders tried to take advantage 
of the confusion to make good his escape from the back of the 
house. But Sara had her eyes on him. Hardly had he gone a few 
yards when she shot him with her own revolver. 
 
Usha Kashyap played the lead role in the drama, which had been 
written by ‘a young Kashmiri writer’. 
 
  In a later issue of the People’s Age, Usha Kashyap wrote that the 
renowned writer K.A. Abbas attended an early performance of ‘Sara’ 
in Srinagar. Abbas was not a Kashmiri, but recorded in his autobiography 
how he was determined to join other progressive cultural 
figures in Srinagar and, with Nehru’s help, got a place on a plane 
while the emergency was at its height. At Srinagar’s airstrip, Abbas was 
met by a young Kashmiri Pandit, D.P. Dhar – a communist worker, 
according to the People’s Age – who later became a political figure of 
great influence in Delhi. Abbas recalled Dhar as ‘a handsome young 
Kashmiri’ who ‘carried a rifle slung over his shoulder … who seemed 
to be doing a dozen things – from training Kashmiri boatmen and 
farmers into a militia to keep track of the infiltrators who were still 
prowling about the valley, and looking after the intellectuals who were 
coming in every day’. 
 
  Abbas recalled that an array of leftist writers and artists had assembled 
in Srinagar. ‘The atmosphere reminded one of Spain and the 
International Brigade where, it was said, writers had come to live their 
books, and poets had come to die for their poetry!’53 The 
International Brigaders in Spain were of course outsiders who fought 
in solidarity with the Spanish struggle against fascism and Abbas and 
many others were similarly displaying solidarity with a cause with 
which they identified strongly but which was not entirely their own. 
India had not won its independence on the battlefield, but the battle 
for Kashmir just weeks after independence day became a rallying 
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point for young progressive nationalists. It also became a focus for 
their creative work in later months and years. Mulk Raj Anand and 
K.S. Duggal, among others, wrote about the Kashmiri nationalist 
struggle. Leftist actors and filmmakers worked together to produce in 
1949 ‘Kashmir Toofan Mei’ (Storm Over Kashmir), a documentary 
film about the tribal raid and the popular response to it. K.A. Abbas 
and Balraj Sahni both played key roles in determining how Kashmir 
came to be depicted in Indian cinema and culture.
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  The presence of artistic talent also shaped the visual depiction of 
the Kashmir movement. Madanjeet Singh, a photographer and 
painter, was among those who headed to Kashmir, in spite of his 
looming final exams at Delhi Polytechnic. He had been invited ‘to 
build the National Cultural front in Srinagar to strengthen Kashmir’s 
secular culture and help in resisting the invaders’. He recalled that 
D.P. Dhar and B.P.L. Bedi were the main patrons of the Cultural 
Front, and found that several Kashmiri poets and writers – notably 
the ‘coolie poet’ Aasi – were also actively engaged in the movement.55 
Some of Madanjeet’s photographs of the militia appeared in the 
communist People’s Age. When a few months later the Kashmir 
Bureau of Information put out a well illustrated propaganda 
pamphlet entitled Kashmir Defends Democracy, it was graced by a 
striking cover designed by Sobha Singh, then a young progressive and 
much later in life renowned for his portraits of the Sikh gurus. This 
combined a photograph of the women’s defence corps with a dramatic 
outline in red of a Kashmiri woman lying and taking aim with a rifle 
(a portrayal of a Kashmiri Muslim milkwoman known as Zuni). In 
design and iconography, as well as in political message, it was a bold 
progressive statement.
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  The guiding role within the militia of communists and their 
supporters, however, attracted the attention of their rivals. To judge 
by the account of N.N. Raina, the authorities in Delhi took fright at 
the extent of communist influence. Early in 1948, Raina asserted, 
Sheikh Abdullah’s deputy, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, took control 
of the militia ‘virtually through a coup … and put it under commanders 
supplied by the Indian Army. Communists were made 
uncomfortable by various provocations.’57 Certainly, in the course of 
1948, the militia’s independence was curtailed and it never became 
the people’s militia that the left had envisaged. 
 
  The Popular Front style of politics pursued by communists in 
Kashmir also fell victim to an abrupt change of line by the 
Communist Party of India. In December 1947, the central committee 
turned sharply to the left, denounced as ‘opportunism’ the policy of 
seeking to work alongside Congress and influence the Nehru government, 
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and called for struggle against the ‘national bourgeois 
leadership’. Two months later, at its second congress, the CPI 
removed P.C. Joshi and installed a hardliner, B.T. Ranadive, as party 
leader. In a key speech, the party’s policy of supporting Sheikh 
Abdullah’s National Conference was condemned. The new emphasis 
was on revolutionary struggle, and particularly on supporting the 
rural uprising in Telengana in another princely state, Hyderabad.
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The building of influence within progressive non-communist parties 
was rejected. 
 
  In his early years in power, however, Sheikh Abdullah established a 
reputation for radicalism. One of his first acts was to rename 
Srinagar’s main square as Lal Chowk (Red Square).59 The echo of 
Moscow was unmistakable – and the name has endured to this day. A 
much more substantial achievement was the execution in the early 
1950s of the most far-reaching land reform in modern India, seeing 
through the most ambitious of the policy proposals in the ‘New 
Kashmir’ manifesto. About half of the state’s arable land was taken 
away from large and medium-size landlords within the initial two 
years of the scheme, creating hundreds of thousands of peasant 
proprietors. The main beneficiaries were poor Muslim villagers in the 
Kashmir Valley. Land redistribution secured Sheikh Abdullah’s power 
base for a generation and is seen as his enduring political success. 
 
  More generally, Sheikh Abdullah was more successful as a political 
mobiliser than as a statesman or administrator. There had been little 
in the way of representative institutions in princely Kashmir, and 
while Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference used the rhetoric 
of democracy they were not by instinct pluralist in their outlook. 
Once settled in power, Sheikh Abdullah became something of an 
autocrat and his critics complained of intolerance and repression. 
Among the communists who initially surrounded Sheikh Abdullah, 
B.P.L. Bedi was given a post in charge of propaganda, but after a while 
there was a parting of the ways. Ghulam Mohiuddin Kara, the hero 
of the Quit Kashmir movement, broke more decisively and set up his 
own political party. Pran Nath Jalali found that his growing disillusionment 
with Sheikh Abdullah’s administration, and concern about 
corruption and abuse of power, was compounded by the indifference 
of the CPI national leadership. He came to Delhi to talk to communist 
leaders but found that they were ‘busy with their own revolution 
those days … I came to the conclusion they were not interested in 
building up a movement [in Kashmir], and the type of movement 
they wanted, I wasn’t interested.’60 
 
  Sheikh Abdullah’s personalised style of governance, and the change 
of outlook by the CPI, together greatly weakened the influence of 
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communists. At the same time, his radicalism and authoritarianism, 
and the legacy of his close association with communists, aroused deep 
misgivings among those inimical to the Soviet Union. Josef Korbel 
came to South Asia in 1948 as the Czechoslovak member of the five 
nation UN Commission for India and Pakistan. When a few years 
later he wrote Danger in Kashmir, the peril he had in mind was the 
sort of Soviet-style communism which had taken root in his home 
country. He regarded Sheikh Abdullah as ‘an opportunist and, worse, 
a dictator’, and expressed the fear ‘that Kashmir might eventually 
become a hub of Communist activities in Southern Asia’.61 
 
  A similar argument was expressed by local critics of Sheikh 
Abdullah. In 1952, a pamphlet entitled Rise of Communism in 
Kashmir rehearsed how the left was using Sheikh Abdullah as a 
‘catspaw’ as they prepared to capture power.62 The following year 
Sheikh Abdullah was removed from office as Kashmir’s prime 
minister, largely because India’s national government came to regard 
him as unreliable on the issue of the permanence of the state’s accession 
to India. Concerns about communist influence continued to 
reverberate. An opposition group asserted that G.M. Sadiq, the most 
high profile communist sympathiser, had great influence in the new 
state government and that there were several other communist ministers. 
‘[If ] no immediate steps are taken to nip the evil’, it warned, 
‘Kashmir may be lost to Communism.’63 
 
  In 1955, the Soviet leaders Khrushchev and Bulganin travelled to 
Srinagar during a visit to India. It was a public demonstration of 
Soviet support for Kashmir’s still disputed union with India – the 
‘Russians are the first great power to have definitely and clearly gone 
on record as accepting the accession of Kashmir to India as final’, 
Kashmir’s constitutional head of state told Nehru.64 In the following 
decade, G.M. Sadiq served as chief minister, still pro-Soviet by faction 
and inclination, but successful above all because he was Delhi’s candidate. 
The steady erosion of Kashmir’s autonomy, and Delhi’s 
persistent interference and rigging of elections, prepared the way for 
the separatist insurgency that erupted in 1989. Some Kashmiris 
sought independence, others wanted to become part of Islamic 
Pakistan – but disaffection with Indian rule was evident across the 
Valley. Over the following two decades, at least 40,000 people, more 
than one in a hundred of the Valley’s adult population, died in the 
conflict between Pakistan-backed militants and Indian security forces. 
 
  Over that time, communists have had little visible presence in 
Kashmir. Many of the youthful communists who enrolled in the 
volunteer militia remained loyal to the ideology all their lives. Yet at 
the time of writing (in the summer of 2009), the Communist Party 
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of India (Marxist) has a solitary member of the Jammu and Kashmir 
state assembly. Sheikh Abdullah’s grandson is chief minister of the 
Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, at the helm of the National 
Conference and governing in alliance with Congress. But the strand 
of militant, pro-India secular nationalism that the Kashmiri communists 
of the 1940s espoused now has limited resonance. The shifting 
sands of Kashmiri politics, however, should not be allowed to obscure 
the substantial role of communists in giving a radical complexion to 
Kashmiri nationalism in the crucial decade of the 1940s, securing 
popular support towards ending princely rule and taking up arms in 
defence of a secular, democratic Kashmir. 
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The University of Kashmir, on the outskirts of Srinagar, boasts a bewitchingly 
beautiful location. It’s sandwiched between the city’s two main lakes, and looks out 
towards the milky-white cupola of the Hazratbal shrine, and beyond to the 
Himalayan foothills which have both protected the Kashmir valley over the ages and 
made its location at the intersection of south Asia, central Asia and Tibet such a 
keenly-sought prize. When I asked one of the leading historians at the University – 
he didn’t want his name published – when Kashmir was last ruled by Kashmiris, he 
replied succinctly and decisively: ‘1586’. Since then the Kashmir valley has been 
under the control, successively, of Mughals, Afghans, Sikhs, Dogras, and, since 1947, 
of the Indian government in Delhi. Kashmir’s story is not quite that simple. The 
Mughals lavished enormous affection and resources on Kashmir. The Dogra princes, 
although outsiders, made Srinagar a capital of at least equal stature to their native 
city of Jammu. And for most of the post-Raj era, the Indian state of Jammu and 
Kashmir has had a Kashmiri Muslim as Chief Minister, at the head of an elected 
government. Yet there is a broader truth. Kashmiris bear an acute sense of grievance 
that for centuries they feel they have had little agency over their own fate. That 
sentiment goes a long way towards explaining why Kashmir’s separatist insurgency 
has proved so tenacious. 
 
The bitter dispute between India and Pakistan over control of Kashmir dates back 
to the 1947 independence settlement. Both had a claim to Kashmir. To telescope a 
complex issue into a single sentence, Kashmir’s Maharaja, a Hindu ruling a largely 
Muslim populace, signed up with India, as he was entitled to, so ignoring Pakistan’s 
argument based on religion, cultural affinity, geography and commerce. He made 
no attempt to consult his subjects. Within weeks of the British pull-out, there was 
heavy fighting in Kashmir. Within months, there was open war between India and 
Pakistan. A ceasefire was agreed, and with it a de facto partition of the former 
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princely state. But no final resolution has ever been achieved. The issue sprang back 
into prominence at the end of the 1980s, with the beginning of an anti-India insurgency 
which was local in inception, but was quickly championed and co-opted by 
Pakistan. The row has frustrated all attempts at friendship between the two 
countries, fuelled a nuclear arms race, buttressed the role of army and intelligence 
service in Pakistan’s public life and impeded India’s ambitions to emerge as a key 
Asian power. It has also, just by the way, brought misery to the five-million people 
of the Kashmir valley. 
 
There’s an enormous literature about Kashmir, much of it deeply partisan, 
densely written and ill researched. The corpus of informed and tolerably unbiased 
historical writing about Kashmir is slender.
1
 That makes the volumes reviewed here 
all the more welcome. Together, they appear to augur a new, and enormously more 
promising, chapter in Kashmir studies. Almost a coming of age. None of these books 
would have been written but for the fifteen years of violence in the Kashmir valley, 
commencing in 1989, which has accounted for, by the most conservative of estimates, 
at least 35,000 lives. All, in different degrees, rise above the clamour of nationalist 
rhetoric to seek a more nuanced and sensitive account of how the Kashmir valley 
became embroiled in such turbulence. 
 
Sumantra Bose, a comparative political scientist at the LSE, has written what is 
likely to become the best regarded introduction to the Kashmir issue. The greater 
part of the book is a sure-footed account of Kashmir’s contemporary history. It’s not 
based on in-depth research into primary sources, but is rather an engagingly written 
and perceptively judged synthesis of earlier writing, enlivened by the citing of news 
reports, of first-hand testimony from visits to the valley and neighbouring areas, and 
a familiarity with Kashmiri poetry and culture which is deployed to good effect. 
 
Bose argues that the Partition settlement of 1947 may be the origin of the 
Kashmir crisis, but it is not the cause of the continuing conflict. That is to be found 
in the failure of democratic institutions to take root in Indian Kashmir, in large 
part because of Delhi’s repeated loss of nerve in dealing with its only Muslimmajority 
state. ‘Kashmir was intended to be the centrepiece of India’s bouquet of 
democratic diversity’, Bose argues. ‘Instead, it became the thorn in the bouquet 
. . . the rupture has very largely been caused by consistently anti-democratic, 
authoritarian policies of successive New Delhi governments towards IJK [Indian 
Jammu and Kashmir].’ 
 
If there was a moment of rupture, it came with the deeply flawed state elections 
in Indian Kashmir in 1987. ‘This was the moment when the [Kashmir] Valley and 
some of its contiguous areas lost all residual confidence in India’s political system.’ 
Bose puts forward three periods in the separatist insurgency which ensued. There 
was the intifada phase of the first five years of the insurrection, when the armed 
separatist movement clearly enjoyed enormous local support. Then came two or 
three years of atrophy and demoralization, as the massive Indian security-force 
presence, and Delhi’s success in taking advantage of divisions within Kashmiri 
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society, took the advantage away from the armed militants. And since 1998, there 
has been the ‘fidayeen’ phase, ‘marked by the renewal of insurgency with a radical 
Islamist ideological color and the ascendancy of Pakistan-based militant groups 
using fidayeen (suicide-squad) tactics against Indian forces’. 
 
All this is well argued and presented. The book went to print well before the latest 
thaw in India-Pakistan relations and a fresh start towards negotiations on Kashmir, 
which became fully apparent at the start of 2004. Persistent American pressure on 
Pakistan’s President Musharraf, already deeply affected by determined assassination 
attempts apparently carried out by onetime Islamist allies, along with India’s 
desire to uncouple itself from the dispute with Pakistan, leap free of the Kashmir 
imbroglio, and punch its full weight as a global economic and diplomatic power, 
offered a real prospect of progress. The problem remains that India, which is in the 
stronger negotiating position, has no intention of relinquishing or diluting its 
sovereignty over the Kashmir valley. And Pakistan, for which the Kashmir issue has 
become intricately bound up with national identity, can hardly walk away from the 
issue it’s been fighting on for more than half-a-century. There is no road map for 
peace in Kashmir because there is no glimmer of a consensus about the final destination. 
 
Sumantra Bose, in the last third of his book, proposes how to seek to reconcile 
this most basic of disputes, two nations fighting for control of the same patch of 
territory. (Many Kashmiris would say a plague on both your houses, and opt for 
independence, but know they will never get the chance.) He is against a plebiscite, 
or repartition, or any redrawing of boundaries, because none of these offer any 
prospect of a neat solution, and some – he fears – could polarize opinion and bring 
the prospect of ‘a short countdown to all-out civil war’. He proposes moves towards 
peace based very loosely on the Northern Ireland peace process, with the 
acknowledgement of the ‘equal legitimacy’ of different political traditions, and three 
parallel strands of dialogue – between India and Pakistan, between Delhi and 
Srinagar, and between the two halves of divided Kashmir. 
 
There are all sorts of problems with this, apart from the fact that the Northern 
Ireland peace process, although successful in dousing down the violence, is 
otherwise not in robust health. The bold moves towards a political settlement in 
Northern Ireland were a product of the shared determination of the British and Irish 
governments to work in concert to achieve a solution. Time and again, British and 
Irish Prime Ministers stood, quite literally, shoulder to shoulder in Belfast to save 
the peace process. It’s not easy to imagine Indian and Pakistani leaders acting 
together in Kashmir in anything like the same way. There are two basic problems in 
Kashmir – both countries fail to understand the strength of the other’s claim to the 
territory, and both fail to appreciate why the compromise solution they favour (in 
India’s case, turning the ceasefire line into an international border, in Pakistan’s, a 
limited repartition to give it those areas with a clear Muslim majority) is unacceptable 
to their adversary. 
 
Prem Shankar Jha is a member of the Indian elite – a political insider and former 
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editor of the most establishment-minded of the country’s English newspapers, the 
Hindustan Times – who has shown courage in breaking ranks on Kashmir and 
drawing attention to human-rights abuses and to Delhi’s political shortsightedness. 
His book, a revised edition of a title that first appeared in 1996, examines the diplomatic 
and political origins of the Kashmir crisis. It is old history, based on extensive 
archive research but unredeemed by any reflection of the lived experience of the 
early stages of the dispute, of the hopes and aspirations of the people of Kashmir, 
or of the political and social dimensions of their alienation from India. It is, all the 
same, revisionist history. The established Indian account about Kashmir’s accession, 
largely taken on trust by scholars (indeed, none of the other books reviewed 
question or challenge the Indian orthodoxy) is that the Maharaja signed up to join 
India on 26 October 1947, as Pakistan-backed Muslim tribesmen advanced on his 
capital, thus legitimizing the airlift of Indian troops which began at first light the next 
morning. The trouble is there’s strong evidence that the senior official of India’s 
States ministry, V. P. Menon, who secured the Maharaja’s signature, never got to see 
him on the 26th, because he arrived at Delhi airport too late in the day to take off 
for Jammu.
2
 He did reach Jammu the following day. But if the Maharaja signed after 
India’s Sikh Regiment started landing at the Kashmir valley’s only airstrip, while 
this might be of limited constitutional and juridical import, it means that India’s 
claim on Kashmir has been based, in some degree, on a lie. 
 
Prem Shankar Jha accepts that Menon did not meet the Maharaja in his Jammu 
palace on 26 October, but suggests instead that he had succeeded in securing the all- 
important signature the previous day, just before the Maharaja fled south from 
Srinagar. V. P. Menon, Jha suggests, deliberately concealed this fact from the 
Cabinet’s Defence Committee. The reason for such subterfuge? Nehru was 
unwilling to accept Kashmir’s accession unless accompanied by the introduction of 
responsible government, while Menon’s patron, India’s home minister and deputy 
Prime Minister Sardar Patel, showed no such scruples. So – Jha argues – Menon 
didn’t want Nehru to know that the Maharaja had signed the accession document 
until he was also able to present the Maharaja’s consent for a prominent role in the 
state government for his nemesis (and Nehru’s friend and ally) Sheikh Abdullah, 
the ‘Lion of Kashmir’ and the commanding Kashmiri Muslim politician of his era. 
 
In support of this inherently unlikely argument, Prem Shankar Jha presents a 
cornucopia of evidence. He has found, and publishes here, the full minutes of the 
crucial meetings of India’s Defence Committee. He chronicles convincingly the 
differing approaches of Nehru and Patel towards Kashmir and its princely ruler. His 
supposed killer fact is the testimony of Field-Marshal Sam Manekshaw, who as a 
young officer accompanied V. P. Menon on his trip to Srinagar – though his account 
is so confused and contradictory it adds little clarity to the controversy. Among 
counter arguments is the very simple one that the page of the Instrument of 
Accession bearing the Maharaja’s signature is dated 26 October, and it is enormously 
more likely that it was back-dated by a day rather than post-dated.
3
 All-inall, 
while Jha may perhaps be right, his argument has the feel of facts being pushed, 
pulled and squeezed to fit his case, rather than a hypothesis developing from the 
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evidence he has accumulated. 
 
The books by Chitralekha Zutshi and Mridu Rai have an enormous amount in 
common. Both authors have immersed themselves in rarely consulted archives in 
Jammu and Srinagar. Both titles are based on doctoral theses submitted to 
American universities. Both have been published by a new and impressive Indian 
imprint, Permanent Black, and will in due course also be published by leading 
university presses in the US. Both contain warm acknowledgements to, and bear the 
intellectual imprint of, the First Couple of South Asian studies in the US, Sugata 
Bose and Ayesha Jalal. And both are concerned about locating Kashmiri political 
and national identity in the decades and centuries prior to 1947, and about challenging 
particularly the Indian shorthand on the social and political underpinning of 
Kashmir’s place in the Indian Union. 
 
Central to both Zutshi and Rai is a discussion of the much vaunted term, Kashmiriyat, 
an expression of a composite culture in which being Kashmiri was a much 
more central identity than religious allegiance. It is Kashmiriyat, so any visitor to 
Srinagar is likely to be told, which explains the old tradition of religious tolerance, 
almost of syncretism, and the historical absence of tension between Kashmiri 
Muslims and the small but prominent (and now departed) Kashmiri-speaking Hindu 
minority – until, that is, India and Pakistan started to meddle. ‘Kashmiri nationalism’s 
memory of the past’, Chitralekha Zutshi asserts, ‘is refracted through rosetinted 
glasses, in which Kashmir appears as a unique region where religious 
communities lived in harmony since time immemorial and difference in religion did 
not translate into acrimonious conflict until external intervention.’ She tackles this 
legend head on. Far from the Mughals heralding the end of Kashmir’s independence, 
she identifies the long period of Mughal role as the era in which Kashmiri poets first 
began to articulate a sense of regional belonging. She describes how Kashmiri 
Pandits (Kashmiri-speaking upper-caste Hindus) turned to emphasizing religious 
identity in the mid nineteenth century, and how Kashmiri Muslims followed suit with 
the first stirrings of political mobilization from the 1930s. 
 
Mridu Rai’s primary concern, slightly narrower, is the way in which the Dogra 
Maharajas who became rulers of Kashmir in 1846 (a princely state that was ‘cobbled 
together’, she says) used the Hindu religion to buttress their authority and establish 
their legitimacy, and the extent to which Kashmiri Muslims – including such secular 
leaders as Sheikh Abdullah who are seen as the political embodiment of Kashmiriyat 
– also used religion to mobilize mass support. She chronicles the arbitrary 
rule of the Dogra princes, their use of Kashmiri Pandits and later of Punjabi Hindus 
as their agents, and the slow development (neither newspapers nor public meetings 
for political purposes were permitted until 1932) of political awareness among the 
impoverished and ill-educated Kashmiri Muslim majority, in which clerical issues 
and religious identity was crucially important. Her most intriguing observation is 
relegated to a footnote – she reports coming across no reference to the term 
‘Kashmiriyat’ prior to 1947. It is not simply unhistorical, but in part an invention arising 
from political convenience. 
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Both monographs break new ground in delving into the complexities of religious, 
class and political identities in Jammu and Kashmir prior to 1947. They also have 
strong political underpinnings – not pro-India nor pro-Pakistan, (though both would 
probably regard themselves as pro-Kashmir on humanitarian as much as political 
grounds), but seeking to correct decades of myth-making and misinformation. 
Mridu Rai has the more overtly political message. India, she suggests, has been little 
better than the Dogra Maharajas in providing political empowerment to Kashmir. 
‘What is surprising is that the erasure of Kashmiris from the enterprise of governing 
them survived the establishment of a “national” government in India after independence 
in 1947.’ Some of her asides are questionable: how can she assert that ‘at 
the moment of the partition of India most Kashmiri Muslims voted clearly (and the 
vast majority continue to do so today) against the Pakistan option’? what is the 
evidence to support her assertion that the pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir 
Liberation Front is ‘probably still the group enjoying widest support in Kashmir’? 
But it is difficult to challenge her conclusion that ‘the clamour by Kashmiri Muslims 
is for a legitimate government. It is the helplessness in which they were placed first 
by their Dogra rulers and then by Indian politicians . . . that has provoked a militant 
response’. 
 
Chitralekha Zutshi expresses the same general sentiment in more carefully 
modulated prose. ‘Had the Indian and Pakistani nation-states been more willing to 
accommodate Kashmir’s regional aspirations, instead of transforming it into a 
symbol of the contest between their competing nationalist visions, it is likely that 
Kashmir would have remained quiescent in the postcolonial period. . . . Clearly, 
political solutions to the “Kashmir problem” will be aborted until nationalist narratives 
– Indian, Pakistani and Kashmiri – that are primarily responsible for its 
intractability, are dismantled.’ It is encouraging that these enormously well informed 
and reflective contributions to Kashmir’s history have appeared just as there seems 
to be a greater willingness on all sides to move away from rhetoric, and to examine 
the complexities of Kashmiri politics and identity. Historians can’t solve conflicts, 
but at least they can chip away at some of the accepted narratives that obstruct a 
broader understanding of the issue, and by so doing make a settlement that little bit 
easier. 
 
 
NOTES AND REFERENCES 
 
1
 Conspicuous among histories of Kashmir are several titles by Alastair Lamb, copiously 
researched but marred by an anti-Indian perspective, and by Victoria Schofield. In the 
United States, both Sumit Ganguly and Robert G. Wirsing have written scholarly 
volumes about the development of the Kashmir dispute. The Indian accounts of most 
interest have been written by journalists – M. J. Akbar, Ajit Bhattacharjea and Manoj 
Joshi – while the most authoritative account from Pakistan is by the historian Hasan 
Zaheer. It is perhaps symptomatic of Kashmiris’ sense of powerlessness that no history 
by a Kashmiri Muslim has achieved a wide audience – the most notable such study to 
appear in English is an enormous two-volume work by Muhammad Yusuf Saraf. 
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2 
The argument against the Instrument of Accession having been signed on 26 October is 
rehearsed by Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the 
Unfinished War(London and New York, 2000), pp. 55–8, and by Alastair Lamb, 
Incomplete Partition: the Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute, 1947–1948 (Hertingfordbury, 
1997), pp. 156–60. 
3 
The whereabouts of the original Instrument of Accession is not at all clear. A facsimile 
of the page of the document bearing the Maharaja’s signature appeared as a frontispiece 
in Sardar Patel’s Correspondence: vol. 1, New Light on Kashmir, ed. Durga Das, 
Ahmedabad, 1971. 
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